



Futuristic Extraordinary Islamic Summit
Conference of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation, 2028

Agenda: Addressing Possible De-escalation of the Rising
Tension in Syria, with Special Emphasis on External
Intervention.

Freeze Date: 8th December, 2024



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CHAIRPERSON'S ADDRESS

"The tyrant dies and his rule ends. The martyr dies and his rule begins."

– Sun Tzu, the Art of War

So we ask you, from the ashes of tyranny, what are we building: a future or a facade? Welcome to The Futuristic Extraordinary Islamic Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The dust has barely settled over Damascus. The Assad regime long feared, long condemned is no more. But what many hailed as the fall of tyranny; may now be the rise of uncertainty. Syria today is not liberated. Syria is contested, a ghost country suspended between past horrors and future chaos. With Assad gone, the world had a choice: rebuild together, or re-divide Syria for their own ends. Sadly, it seems the latter has begun to unfold. The United States, once a reluctant kingmaker in this region, now fights a war of whispers with its old ally Turkey. Ankara, emboldened by its military reach, props up a rival government in the north, while the Gulf States throw weight behind a fractured Transitional Government in the south. And between them? Broken people, a torn land, and the ashes of a revolution that dared to dream of freedom.

The Syrian conflict has exposed deep divisions within the *Muslim Ummah*, as regional powers pursue different agendas. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed the Transitional Government to expand their influence in Syria and strengthen regional stability, Iran aligned with Hezbollah initially against Israeli invasions and then against the Transitional Government, to counter the growing influence of the Sunni militias and the Gulf States. These reflect not unity, but a



fragmentation of the Ummah, where sectarian and geopolitical rivalries have overtaken the ideal of Islamic solidarity.

From a stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a rift between Washington and Ankara, an unanticipated peace treaty signed by Syria and Israel to a defence agreement between Turkey, Russia and China the world has seen it all. While the establishment of this conference may represent a step toward Syria's future governance, the emergence of extremist violence particularly exemplified by Operation Socrates and the bombing of Hagia Sophia regrettably underscores that much of the nation remains trapped in the unresolved legacies of its past.

The situation in Syria threatens war - not just between Turkey and Syria, but also between Tehran and Riyadh, not just between the new enemies, but also between past allies. The existence of Ummah is threatened and the entire Muslim world is endangered. Delegates, now you, as delegates of the OIC, must decide whether Syria becomes the flashpoint of a new global divide or the blueprint for multilateral rebirth. Will it become the downfall of the Islamic world or the renewal of Ummah.

Till June,
Saksham Bihani and Nickunj Benani,
Co-Chairpersons,
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TOPIC AREA SUMMARY



Delegates, welcome to Saudi Arabia. Presently, the Middle East, more specifically the Syrian Region, is plagued with war, with insurgencies and rebellions rising ceaselessly and unrest prevailing among the common people.

Syria is a country whose history has never been written in ink - it has always been written in blood. From the Ba'athist rise in the 1960s to the chemical clouds that choked children in Ghouta in 2013, this land has known destruction as its legacy and war as its inheritance. The Syrian Civil War which began in 2011 continued for more than a decade, leaving a permanent mark on all coming generations. For



more than a decade, international red lines were crossed, erased and redefined. Finally, after years of fighting and immeasurable destruction, the Assad Regime fell on 8th December 2024, when rebel forces finally managed to take down the last of the Ba'athist Government's defense and President Bashar al-Assad, once called the "Butcher of Damascus" was forced to flee to Moscow under the cover of darkness, his regime finally devoured by the chaos he had cultivated. Finally the world thought "never again", yet Damascus whispered "then watch again".

The year is 2028 and Syria is once again threatened, however this time not by a tyrannical maniac, but rather several different conflicts which together threaten the very existence of Syria and perhaps the existence of the Middle East. The circumstances are such that they threaten not only the Ummah but also the very existence of Islamic Unity. The major conflicts contributing to the situation are -

Turkey - Syria Conflict

The Turkish Syrian conflict at hand is rooted in the Turkey-Kurdish issue which has been existing for several decades. Turkey's absolute refusal to cooperate with Kurdish parties was tested to its brink, when the Hay'at Tahrir al Sham of Syria joined hands with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces to form a coalition government for controlling Syria. This sparked resentment from Turkey, resentment which gradually through the 4 years between December 2024 and April 2028, turned into sheer hatred. There are several factors which have brought the Turkish-Syrian conflict to where it is now, which include Turkey's reluctance to work with Kurdish forces, suppression



of the Turkish backed Interim Government by the Coalition government and most importantly, the collapse of Turkey-PKK peace process in 2027.

However what these events have collectively resulted in is that Turkey now through Operation Socrates, has taken over several strategic areas of Northern Syria including the city of Aleppo. Turkey-Syrian tensions are at an all time high where the Syrian Government has given Turkey a strict ultimatum, to turn back and return to its territory or face the consequences while Turkey remains stubborn that its incursions in Syria are crucial to maintain Turkey's integrity and security. Although, currently on 14th April, 2028, no war has been declared with both Turkish and Syrian soldiers in a standstill, yet the regional tensions along with Syrian Government's policy towards the Turkish Forces make a war not just possible, but applicable. The answer to the question of whether these tensions will lead to another gruesome war in Syria or lasting peace agreements, is what the future holds for this committee.

External Intervention

The United States helped the Syrian Transitional Government (TGS) a lot in their battle against extremists backed by the Interim Government which had Turkey's support. On that day, the U.S. advised Turkey to dissociate itself from the Interim Government and foster unity among all Syrian parties. After a terrible attack in Raqqa on December 5, 2025 killed over 60 Syrian soldiers and six American diplomats, U.S. support for the coalition strengthened and resulted in a review of U.S. policy. On January 12, 2026, the Trump team



unveiled a plan that sent more than 1,500 troops and provided armed, financial and intelligence support to the TGS as well as the Kurdish-led SDF. Besides, the U.S. assisted in making the As-salam fir Suriya non-aggression deal between Israel and Syria on April 1, 2026, proving its strong influence in the region. When tensions increased with Hezbollah, the U.S. solicited Syrian forces to patrol the Lebanese border on December 17, 2026 which moved the TGS further in line with U.S. goals. Washington gave word on January 30, 2027, to give military help to the TGS, making its role in the Syrian conflict even clearer. At the same time, on May 22, 2027, U.S. airstrikes did not stop Hurras al-Din from gaining control of important cities along the Syrian border. In July and August, thanks to U.S. assistance, Hurras al-Din was weakened so that Syria could launch an operation against Hezbollah, getting help from Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of Abdullah Öcalan's assassination on September 18, things heated up and a PKK insurgency in Turkey restarted on October 2. Turkey was upset by the U.S. assisting Kurdish fighters, saying it encouraged them to split from the nation. The U.S. played an active role in the fight against extremists and helped the TGS and Kurdish leaders which added to the already high tensions in the region. Both Russia and China helped to raise the level of the crisis, but they did so in different ways. Russia made Turkey a stronger ally by delivering Su-57 jets and sending the Wagner Group to secure Russian-owned ports in Latakia, Syria, by early March 2028. China, forming a defense partnership with Russia, showed it stands with Turkey, giving indirect support to its attack on Kurdish regions in Syria. Turkey and Iran opposed American involvement in Syria and pushed Turkey's foreign goals which made the international environment more complex.



ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION **(OIC)**

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the **second largest inter-governmental organisation** after the United Nations, with the membership of **57 states**, covering four continents. The Organization was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took place in **Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco** on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (25 September 1969) following the criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem.

The OIC is the **collective voice of the Muslim world** to ensure and safeguard their interest in economic, social and political areas. The OIC has Institutions, which implement its programmes. Its Headquarters is in **Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**. In 1970 the first ever meeting of Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (**ICFM**) was held in Jeddah which decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Jeddah headed by the organization's secretary general.

In 1972, the 3rd ICFM Session adopted the first OIC Charter. The organization's goals and guiding principles, as well as its primary goals of fostering greater unity and collaboration among its member states, were established in the Charter. From its original 30 states, the membership has expanded to 57 states during the past 40 years. The Charter was modified to reflect the global realities that have emerged. The Eleventh Islamic Summit, which took place in Dakar from March 13–14, 2008, accepted the current OIC Charter, which will serve as the cornerstone of the organization's future Islamic activities in accordance with 21st-century demands.



Under Article 1 of the OIC ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION Charter,

The objectives of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation shall be:

1. To enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States;
2. To safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes of the Member States and coordinate and unify the efforts of the Member States in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the international community in general;
3. To respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State;
4. To support the restoration of complete sovereignty and territorial integrity of any Member State under occupation, as a result of aggression, on the basis of international law and cooperation with the relevant international and regional organisations;
5. To ensure active participation of the Member States in the global political, economic and social decision-making processes to secure their common interests;
6. To promote inter-state relations based on justice, mutual respect and good neighbourliness to ensure global peace, security and harmony;
7. To reaffirm its support for the rights of peoples as stipulated in the UN Charter and international law;



8. To support and empower the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self determination and establish their sovereign State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, while safeguarding its historic and Islamic character as well as the Holy places therein;
9. To strengthen intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation; in order to achieve economic integration leading to the establishment of an Islamic Common Market;
10. To exert efforts to achieve sustainable and comprehensive human development and economic well-being in Member States;
11. To disseminate, promote and preserve the Islamic teachings and values based on moderation and tolerance, promote Islamic culture and safeguard Islamic heritage;
12. To protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam and encourage dialogue among civilisations and religions;
13. To enhance and develop science and technology and encourage research and cooperation among Member States in these fields;
14. To promote and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the rights of women, children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the preservation of Islamic family values;
15. To emphasize, protect and promote the role of the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society;
16. To safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Member States;



17. To promote and defend unified position on issues of common interest in the international fora;
18. To cooperate in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, organised crime, illicit drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering and human trafficking;
19. To cooperate and coordinate in humanitarian emergencies such as natural disasters;
20. To promote cooperation in social, cultural and information fields among the Member States.

Article 3 of the OIC Charter mandates the membership of the OIC:

1. The Organisation is made up of 57 States members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other States which may accede to this Charter in accordance with Article 3 paragraph 2.
2. Any State, member of the United Nations, having Muslim majority and abiding by the Charter, which submits an application for membership may join the Organisation if approved by consensus only by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the basis of the agreed criteria adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.
3. Nothing in the present Charter shall undermine the present Member States' rights or privileges relating to membership or any other issues.



Referring to **peaceful settlement of disputes**, the OIC adheres to **article 27 and 28** of its charter according to which,

The Member States, parties to any dispute, the continuance of which may be detrimental to the interests of the **Islamic Ummah** or may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, seek a solution by **good offices, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement** or other peaceful means of their own choice. In this context good offices may include consultation with the Executive Committee and the Secretary-General.

The Organisation may cooperate with other international and regional organisations with the objective of preserving international peace and security, and settling disputes through peaceful means.

THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT:

The Islamic Summit is composed of Kings and Heads of State and Government of Member States and is the supreme authority of the Organisation. It convenes once every three years to deliberate, take policy decisions. It also provides guidance on all issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives and considers other issues concerning the Member States and the Ummah. The decisions of the Islamic Summit are implemented by the General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

Since its inception in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 22-25 September 1969, the Islamic Summit Conference has convened eleven times with the last in Dakar, Senegal on 13 – 14 March 2008. **SESRIC** regularly participates in the Islamic Summit Conference



along with other subsidiary, specialised and affiliated organs and committees of the OIC.

They formulate policies and adopt resolutions at the end of each summit. Islamic summit is based on three principles; **Final Communique, Resolution, and Declaration.**

Chapter IV of the OIC Charter deals with the Islamic Summit.

Under Article 7,

The Islamic Summit shall **deliberate, take policy decisions and provide guidance on all issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives as provided for in the Charter and consider other issues of concern to the Member States and the Ummah.**

Article 8.1: The Islamic Summit shall convene every three years in one of the Member States.

Article 8.2: The Preparation of the Agenda and all necessary arrangements for the convening of the Summit will be done by the Council of Foreign Ministers with the assistance of the General Secretariat.

The summit exists to:

- **Strengthen Islamic solidarity** among member states.
- **Coordinate political, economic, social, cultural, and scientific collaboration.**
- **Resolve conflicts** and promote peace in the Muslim world.



Key Agendas Discussed at Summits:

- **Palestine and Al-Quds (Jerusalem)**
- **Combating terrorism and extremism**
- **Peace and security** in conflict zones like Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan

EXTRAORDINARY ISLAMIC SUMMIT:

Article 9 deals with the procedure of an extraordinary session of Islamic summit.

Extraordinary Sessions will be held, whenever the interests of Ummah warrant it, to consider **matters of vital importance to the Ummah and coordinate the policy of the Organisation** accordingly. An Extraordinary Session may be held at the recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers or on the initiative of one of the Member States or the Secretary-General, provided that such initiative obtains the support of a simple majority of the Member States.

Such extraordinary sessions can be called under the mandate of the OIC by the current presiding nation of the OIC. The member nations have the right to call for an extraordinary session of Islamic Summit in order to discuss a matter of urgent importance.



| SL NO. | DATE | VENUE | AGENDA |
|--------|-------------------|--------------|--|
| 1 | 23–24 March 1997 | Pakistan | Addressing the situation in Afghanistan and other pressing issues in the Muslim world. |
| 2 | 4–5 March 2003 | Qatar | Responding to escalating tensions in the Middle East, particularly the impending war in Iraq. |
| 3 | 7–8 December 2005 | Saudi Arabia | Addressing the crisis in Islam and outlining a 10-year modernization program. |
| 4 | 14–15 August 2012 | Saudi Arabia | Discussing the Syrian civil war and its implications for the Muslim world. |
| 5 | 6–7 March 2016 | Indonesia | Addressing conflicts in the Middle East, radicalism, terrorism, and reaffirming support for Palestine. |
| 6 | 13 December 2017 | Turkey | Responding to the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. |



| | | | |
|----|------------------|--------------|---|
| 7 | 18 May 2018 | Turkey | Condemning Israeli aggression and the U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem. |
| 8 | 11 November 2023 | Saudi Arabia | Addressing Israeli military actions in Gaza and the West Bank. |
| 9 | 18 October 2023 | Saudi Arabia | Addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza following escalations in the region. |
| 10 | 14 April 2028 | Saudi Arabia | Addressing possible de-escalation of the rising tension in Syria, with special emphasis on external intervention. |



FREEZE DATE OF THE COMMITTEE

The Freeze Date of the Futuristic Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is on the **8th of December, 2024**. Any events or decisions, whether they are political, economic, social, administrative or military in nature, will not be taken into consideration by the Executive Board. Thus, they will not be admissible in the committee.

Events occurring on or after 8th of December, 2024 are under the discretion of the Executive Board and will be released in the committee as updates, except for those which have already been mentioned in the Timeline formulated by the Executive Board.

The series of events after 8th December, 2024 mentioned in the Timeline will be taken into consideration by the Executive Board of the Futuristic Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and thus, will be admissible in committee.

The Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is currently being held on **April 14th, 2028**.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT



The Spark: Arab Spring Protests (2011)

In the year of 2011, resulting from the Arab Spring uprisings happening across the Middle East and North Africa. Syrians went to the streets to demand change after decades of authoritarian rule under the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The immediate response for the act came from the southern city of Daraa where a group of teenagers were arrested and tortured for painting anti-regime graffiti on a school wall. This incident ignited a widespread outrage that led to acts that



quickly spread to other cities such as Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and the capital, Damascus. The protesters called for an end to the repression of the rule and the emergency law that was in place for decades. They also demanded political reform, greater civil liberties, and the release of political prisoners. Although the early protests were peaceful, the government of President Bashar al-Assad, who had ruled Syria since 2000, when he took over from his father Hafez al-Assad, responded with intransigent brutality. Security forces, including brutal intelligence services and soldiers, shot and arrested protesters on a mass scale, and imposed curfews. Entire neighborhoods were under siege, and there were widespread reports of torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. Instead of suppressing dissent, this brutal repression merely inflamed popular anger and



radicalized many of those who had initially attempted to bring about change peacefully.

From Protest to War: The Rise of Armed Opposition (2011-2012)

As 2011 came to a close, the stakes intensified. People of the opposition began to take up arms for self-defense during this time, which led to military defectors forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the intent to displace Assad and foster a democratic state. Former soldiers and civilian volunteers became the core of the FSA, who overpowered other fronts. The FSA was first made out to be the principal soldiering opposition faction, however, with declining security conditions and rampant violence from regiments, opportunities began opening doors for more harsh, abrasive forces to join in. By the middle of 2012, more radical forces like al-Qaeda's affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra were gaining traction. Unlike the FSA, these forces were extremely well-organized, funded and militarized, and received aid from hardline regional actors alongside a plethora of foreign fighters. Additionally, the Kurdish minority in Syria began taking advantage of the regime's partial retreat from northern territories in an attempt to gain autonomy for themselves. During this time the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) began emerging as the foremost power in areas with high concentrations of Kurdish population, emphasizing self-governance alongside defense rather than armed direct conflict with the Assad regime forces.



The Fractured Battlefield: Cities Under Siege (2012-2013)

As time progressed in 2012, Syria underwent radical changes and turned into regions filled with opposing factions, cities which were once the epicenter of economic and cultural activities met the glasnost. Aleppo, the most populous city in the country and its economic center, was split into government-held western districts and opposition-held eastern neighborhoods. Its urban areas saw some of the most brutal urban combat during the war, with heavy artillery bombardments, airstrikes, and hand-to-hand fighting leveling the city. Homs, which was once "Capital of the Revolution," witnessed a brutal siege, most famously in its Baba Amr district which served as a symbol of defiance against the regime. After an extensive and brutal drawn-out military campaign, the government succeeded in regaining control of the region, but at great cost as it resulted in widespread destruction. Hama, a long-standing hotbed of dissent in the country, was put under siege for violent crackdowns and was also subjected to extreme violence following an infamous massacre in 1982 during Hafez al-Assad's reign. All of these cities had high civilian death tolls, demolished important facilities, and displaced hundreds of thousands of peoples. These cities and the remainder of the regions underwent extreme violence and had massive civilian death tolls and demolished important facilities alongside the infrastructure. The violence initiated a systematic deepening fracture of Syrian society into sects and cemented ethnicities alongside political parties. The majority was made up of Sunni Muslims who fiercely opposed the regime, and a large Alawite, minority group which as a backbone of support out of blind loyalty, turned out. Christians, Druze, and other minority groups were caught in the middle, often fearing the Assad regime and increasingly radical opposition. With confidence collapsing and



fighting escalating, law and order collapsed across much of the country.

International Intervention and Regional Proxy War (2012-2013)

By late 2012 and early 2013, the conflict had drawn a broad array of foreign powers. Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah openly supported the Assad regime with arms, funds, and fighters. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplied money and weapons to opposition forces, often to Islamist groups. Turkey became a chief supporter of opposition forces and hosted hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, while Western nations, including the United States and European allies, supplied little aid, mostly to moderate rebels.

The foreign intervention made the conflict internationalized, Syria becoming a stage for regional and international competitions. The previously fractured opposition then also split apart as groups vied for territory, influence, and foreign support. Amid violence and turmoil, the extremist movement ISIS—then a splinter of al-Qaeda in Iraq—started making its impact felt in Syria in 2013. While the other rebel groups cared little for fighting Assad, ISIS had its sights set on establishing a caliphate, ruling by fear and radical ideology. Their ascendancy gave the war a new, horrific dimension, shifting international attention away from the Assad regime and towards counterterrorism. At the end of 2013, Syria had been ruined. Over 100,000 were dead, millions displaced, and the nation divided into several pieces of control by the regime, moderate and extremist rebels, Kurdish forces, and extremist groups. Cities had been reduced




to rubble, and the social fabric of Syrian society had been shattered. What had begun as a promising, peaceful demand for reform had become a long, multi-faceted civil war with no end in sight, one that would continue to brutalize the nation and destabilize the broader region for years to come.

The ISIS Caliphate and International Response (2014)

The year 2014 saw the introduction of another terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, expanding the geographical scope of the ongoing Syrian war. ISIS was previously affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq's subsidiary, and they separated from Al-Qaeda earlier that same year due to strategic and ideological differences over the immediate establishment of a caliphate supposed to be placed at the center of territories captured through extreme violence. This separation marked the enraged borderless crusade previously known as the ISIS, now vehemently independent.

ISIS proclaimed an Islamic Caliphate in Raqqa as its de jure capital under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who aggressively expanded ISIS's territory in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Abu helped achieve almost instantaneous success through an uprooting blitz style conquest paired with subhumane violence, including public executions, merciless enslaving of notable minorities like the Yazidis. The ISIS sponsored unparalleled transnational radical Islamic terrorism's propaganda





machine digitally telecasted these heinous acts which led to the capture of thousands of foreign extremists in the simultaneous crusade jaw-droppingly branded as humanitarian and defensive in nature.

The scope of the Syrian civil war was brutally and sharply propelled by the group's unconditional uprising. ISIS exceeded the line of whims across the world. Conflicting with most other participants of the war, ISIS distinguished itself with a global menace. They boldly declared war against the West, planned attacks outside the Middle East. Their control over oil fields, in addition to border towns, provided constructional strength and operational range unlike any other group in the region.

To counter the escalating threat, the United States spearheaded a coalition of international partners into Syria and Iraq to eliminate ISIS's grasp over territory. Airstrikes, special operations, and assistance to local ground forces, such as the Kurdish militias and a few vetted opposition groups, became the primary focus of the international response. Although ISIS's expansion further fragmented the already complex alliances and rivalries in the Syrian war, this development marked a shift in focus: the world could no longer afford to ignore the fact that the Syrian conflict was unlike any other civil war—it had become a war with truly global ramifications.

Coalition Airstrikes and the Rise of the SDF (2014-2015)

Initiated in late 2014, the international coalition of Western powers and regional allies carried out a campaign of continuous airstrikes against ISIS facilities in Syria and Iraq. Targets were military camps, oil refineries, weapons caches, and command centers, meant to cripple ISIS's logistical and financial infrastructures. Concomitantly, the



coalition supplied necessary support to local ground troops, most critically the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Iraqi army, with training, arms, intelligence, and tactical coordination. This campaign, made complex by the absence of a cohesive opposition force and risk of civilian casualties, managed to stem ISIS's march and coaxed the group into retreat gradually. The success of the campaign relied on ground troops, and among the best were the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), established in 2015. This multi-ethnic force, established primarily on Kurdish fighters but also Arab, Assyrian, and other minority militias, was the most trusted local ally in the fight against ISIS.

The SDF's ascendancy was instrumental in turning the war against ISIS. With US backing, the SDF conducted large-scale offensives that culminated in the capture of strategic ISIS strongholds like Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. These successes critically undermined ISIS's grip on Syrian territory and broke its capacity to function as a viable state. The SDF's disciplined organization, local knowledge, and ideological commitment to pluralistic politics endowed them not just as a fighting force but as an emerging political force. Their triumph, however, elicited violent resistance from Turkey, which perceived the YPG—the SDF's preponderant force—as a terror organization colluding with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), against whom it has been waging war for decades. The geopolitics rivalry aside, the SDF's role in defeating ISIS meant international recognition and a shift in the balance of forces in northern Syria, creating another layer of complication in an already complex battlefield.



Russian Intervention and Assad's Resurgence (2015-2018)


During this time, the war deepened into an all-out international war, with foreign powers increasing their intervention in the pursuit of strategic interests. In September 2015, Russia intervened directly in favor of the Assad regime, fundamentally altering the balance of the war. Under the cover of fighting terrorism, Russia deployed fighter aircraft, bombers, military advisers, and special forces. However, most Russian airstrikes were not against al-Qaeda groups but against moderate opposition forces—including those supported by Western governments. With Russian air cover, the Syrian Arab Army waged a series of successful campaigns, recapturing strategic cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Eastern Ghouta. These victories came at a horrific human cost: widespread employment of barrel bombs, cluster munitions, chemical weapons, and siege warfare resulted in mass civilian casualties, international condemnation, and war crimes accusations. Russian intervention not only ensured the Assad regime but also proclaimed Moscow's return as a primary player in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Iranian and Hezbollah Military Support

Concurrently, Iran and its proxy militia alliance, dominated by Hezbollah, increased its presence in Syria, supporting Assad's troops on the ground. Syria was a strategic connective hinge in Iran's "Axis of Resistance" against the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The IRGC deployed advisers and oversaw thousands of foreign militiamen from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, usually in the form of elite Shia militias such as Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun. These

troops provided much-needed manpower in pivotal battles, usually in tandem with Syrian forces and under the shadow of Russian air cover. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militant organization with deep-rooted connections with Damascus, served a similar function. Its battle-hardened combatants were at the center of the recapture of strategic neighborhoods such as Qusayr in 2013 and Aleppo in 2016. Hezbollah's role became more entrenched, with the organization effectively acting as an extension of the Assad state's military apparatus. This conjunction of Russian air power and Iranian-led ground fighting enabled the regime to shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy, gradually reclaiming lost territory and destroying rebel strongholds.

Turkey's Military Interventions Begin (2016)



On August 24, 2016, Turkey initiated a military operation in the northern part of Syria, called the Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkish officials declared that the cross-border incursion was grounded on the self-defence rights mentioned under the United Nations Charter Article 51.

Ankara explained that the main objectives of the cross-border military campaign were to maintain border security and confront the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorism, and to deny the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organisation.



– as well as its affiliates Syrian PYD/YPG – a fait accompli to create autonomous zones on Turkey's doorstep.

The Turkish campaign was proven effective in terms of operational tempo and military-geostrategic progress. Especially in the initial stages starting from Jarablus, Turkey captured its operational targets swiftly. Speaking in military-geostrategic terms, the operation cleared an area of 1,100 sq km in the first 50 days, and subsequently controlled an area of 2,000 sq km as it reached al-Bab. The Turkish forces' achievements in the east of Azaz and Mare towns, and in Dabiq, were especially of key importance in paving the way towards a final push towards al-Bab. Moreover, the operation secured the necessary territorial depth into Syria for Turkey's defence in order to confront ISIL's attrition efforts. As the military operation progressed towards capturing al-Bab by November-December 2016, determining parameters and military characteristics of the conflict shifted. As the fighting carried on, ISIL adopted hybrid tactics – a synchronised form of regular and irregular fighting.

Even though the United States-led anti-ISIL coalition gave some support to the operation, their stance drastically changed when Ankara decided to push deeper into al-Bab. Major military handicaps emanating from the lack of coalition support had become visible in close-air support and target acquisition missions, especially in unfavourable weather conditions. The frustration in Turkey was so big that even the use of Incirlik airbase by the coalition members has come under debate.

When Ankara criticised the West for its lack of support, Turkey has started to conduct joint air operations with Russia over al-Bab since mid-January. The operations were reported effective in breaking ISIL's resistance hubs, and marked a turning point in the course of the



Syrian Civil War. This cooperation was even reinforced by the Astana talks.

Operation Olive Branch: Turkey vs. Kurdish Forces (2018)

The Turkish Armed Forces in coordination with the Free Syrian Army launched Operation Olive Branch in the Afrin region of the northern part of Syria. Then under the de facto control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The operation was triggered by the reports of a potential plan of the United States of America to deploy 30,000 SDF border security forces in northern Syria. This was an initiative that provoked strong opposition from Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly condemned the move, referring to the SDF as a "terror army" and declared Turkey's intent to eliminate the threat before it could materialize.

The main goals of the operation, at least from Ankara's perspective, were to prevent the establishment of a so-called "terror corridor" along its border with Syria, to cut the Rojava territory off from its western border in Afrin, and to re-establish stability by cleansing the territory of terrorist forces, which Turkey equated with the YPG, the SDF's largest militia. Turkish officials portrayed the operation as a move to free the local population from oppression and to secure the border between Turkey and Syria.

Over the course of more than two months of heavy combat, Turkish troops and their Syrian allies swept through Afrin, ultimately taking the city center in March 2018. The campaign was costly in casualties to all involved, but especially the SDF, as well as civilians, in terms of large-scale displacement and additional instability in the already turbulent region. After the capture of Afrin, Turkish troops enforced



their presence along the border, taking control of a large section of Syrian territory.

Operation Olive Branch was a significant escalation of Turkish military operations within Syria and demonstrated its increasing audacity in opposing Kurdish self-governance along its border and deepening the Turkey-U.S. divide on Syrian policy.

The War's End Phase: Assad's Pyrrhic Victory (2018)

By December 2018, the Assad regime and its powerful supporters had reasserted control over much of Syria's population centers. But the war was far from over. Much of Syria was still divided, with rebel forces still holding Idlib Province under a fragile ceasefire, Kurdish-led forces governing a de facto autonomous zone in the northeast, and Turkish forces holding border provinces in the north. And ISIS, territorially defeated, had not been exterminated and continued to fight an insurgency through sleeper cells and guerrilla raids. The war's humanitarian cost was appalling: more than half a million people were killed, more than 13 million displaced, and several cities were left in ruins. The war had not merely remade Syria but rewritten the strategic landscape of the entire Middle East, involving great powers and deepening sectarian, ethnic, and geopolitical fault lines that would continue to shape events long after the final bullets were fired.

This combined Iranian-Hezbollah intervention not only bolstered Assad's military, but it also shifted the balance of power in the region. It also further strengthened Iran's position in the Levant and



established Hezbollah deeper in the Syrian theater—alarming Israel and heightening larger Middle Eastern tensions. Even in their military victory, their actions also helped to further polarize Syria along sectarian lines, most notably between Sunni opposition forces and Shia-aligned pro-regime militias.

Apart from the open-scale combat, the province remained in a tenuous stalemate. Idlib remained densely populated, poor, and unstable—both a testament to the residual strength of the opposition and the open-endedness of the Syrian conflict. The fate of the province remained a source of contention in the wider geopolitics between Russia, Turkey, and the Assad regime.

Continued Turkish-Kurdish Conflict (2019-2022)

Between 2019 and 2022, the north of Syria was the center of rising tensions between Turkey and Kurdish forces, primarily the YPG. Despite the YPG's crucial role in the defeat of ISIS and its alliance with the U.S.-led coalition, Ankara perceived the growing autonomy of the group as an open challenge to Turkish hegemony. In October 2019, following a limited withdrawal by the United States, Turkey invaded northeast Syria in Operation Peace Spring, establishing a "safe zone" and driving Kurdish forces back. The invasion displaced tens of thousands of individuals, was met with international condemnation, and elicited accusations of ethnic cleansing from human rights organizations.

Follow-on Turkish actions—such as Operation Claw-Lightning and Operation Claw-Sword—continued to advance Ankara's control into Syrian border areas, solidifying its military presence by coordinating with Syrian rebel proxies. The operations added to the already tense



environment, compelling the SDF to shift resources from counter-terror and detainee management to counter-Turkish attacks. Kurdish forces continued to secure camps such as al-Hol, which held thousands of ISIS fighters and their families under worsening humanitarian circumstances.

The Kurdish dilemma strained US-Turkish relations and opened up new channels of coordination between the SDF and the Assad regime, which intermittently deployed troops into contested territory under unofficial agreements with Russian backing. Between Turkish incursions, ISIS revivals, and desertion by some of the Western patrons, Syria's Kurds were the most consequential but increasingly lonely actor in the war's unraveling. Uncertainty over their future underscored the ongoing fragmentation of Syria where competing actors continued to seek incompatible goals on a shattered battlefield.

U.S.-Turkey Relations Deteriorate (2019-2022)

U.S.-Turkey relations grew increasingly strained between 2019 and 2022, primarily due to Washington's continued support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-led coalition that had proven instrumental in defeating ISIS in northeastern Syria. While the U.S. viewed the SDF as a reliable and effective partner in the fight against terrorism, Turkey vehemently opposed the alliance, arguing that the SDF's backbone, the YPG (People's Protection Units), was indistinguishable from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)—a group that Turkey, the U.S., and the EU officially recognize as a terrorist organization.

Despite repeated Turkish demands to cut ties, the U.S. maintained military cooperation with the SDF, including training, intelligence



sharing, and logistical support. This diplomatic rift deepened after Turkey's 2019 Operation Peace Spring, during which Turkish forces attacked SDF-held territories following a partial U.S. withdrawal. Although some American troops remained in Syria—particularly around oil fields and strategic installations—the perceived betrayal of the Kurds by the U.S. (in withdrawing troops) and the simultaneous continued support for them militarily infuriated Ankara.

Tensions escalated further over Turkey's growing military cooperation with Russia, particularly the controversial purchase of the S-400 missile defense system, which led to U.S. sanctions under the CAATSA framework. In the Syrian theatre, both nations found themselves pursuing diverging goals—the U.S. focused on counterterrorism and stabilization, while Turkey prioritized weakening Kurdish autonomy and securing its southern border.

The result was a complex, uneasy triangle: the U.S. stuck with its Kurdish partners to maintain pressure on ISIS and preserve influence in the region; Turkey viewed this as a threat to its sovereignty and national security; and the Kurdish groups themselves found their fate increasingly precarious, trapped between powerful patrons with conflicting agendas.

The Frozen War and Internal Collapse (2023-2024)



By 2023, the Syrian war had become a frozen war in large part, one less defined by wide open front-line fighting and more by entrenched divisions, occasional battles, and increasing internal crises. While President Bashar al-Assad's regime technically controlled much of Syrian ground—particularly the west and south, including Damascus, Latakia, Hama, and parts of Aleppo—a large and strategically placed portion of land was out of its control.

North-west of Aleppo was Idlib province, which remained in the control of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the other rebel Islamist factions in the shape of a de facto quasi-state with its own bureaucracy. There was a heavy Turkish military presence under the guise of "de-escalation zones" but still harbored some of the opposition. Idlib was sporadically bombed and shelled despite



ceasefire agreements with Russia, and tensions remained elevated in the area.

To its northeast was the SDF-governed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), dominated by the Kurds. It possessed extensive oil deposits and fertile land, and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria thus had strategic and economic clout. There was a modest but important American military presence here that partnered with the SDF to eradicate ISIS cells, which were deeply rooted in desert fortresses or active out of packed detention centers and refugee camps.

To its north, Turkey still maintained and controlled a string of buffer zones from Afrin to Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), following successive military gains since 2016. They were administered via Turkish-backed Syrian militias, who were regularly accused of war crimes and human rights violations. The areas were subject to demographic engineering, infrastructure instability, and constant battles with Kurdish forces, further deepening the humanitarian crisis.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime, while master of the battlefield, was falling apart internally. Decades of war, sanctions by the international community, systemic corruption, and a free-falling economy had brought Syria to its knees. The currency had been devalued, essential commodities were out of reach, and such amenities as electricity, healthcare, and water were nonexistent in most of Syria. Millions of Syrians lived in absolute poverty, surviving on humanitarian aid. Bread queues, fuel shortages, and wide scale unemployment became the new norm in regime-held Syria.

It got worse because of increasing war weariness among loyalist groups, whose sons were killed during the war and now did not see



anything changing for the better. Protests resumed, especially in the Suwayda region of the south, where the Druze community was holding consecutive anti-regime protests calling for economic stimulus and political reform. The regime responded to these protests with a mix of repression and indifference, which further isolated the public.

Assad's foreign patrons also started withdrawing their support. Russia, busy with the conflict in Ukraine and battered by its own sanctions and economic challenges, cut back its financial and military aid to Syria. Iran, stretched thin across the region and threatened at home by internal opposition, had to make decisions. Even Assad's most adamant supporters seemed unwilling or incapable of supporting his collapsing regime.

By December 2024, the cumulative effect of economic meltdown, administrative collapse, institutional rot, and popular indignation had left a political vacuum. The Syrian army collapsed, militias abandoned their posts, and cities fell into chaos. On 8 December 2024, after weeks of internal crisis, the Assad regime officially collapsed, with Bashar al-Assad either having fled the country or hiding from view.

This sudden turn shattered the already fragile status quo, casting Syria into a new period of uncertainty and reequilibration. In the vacuum of power, HTS-dominated rebel militias seized Damascus and the other major cities and formed a transitional government. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, led by the Kurds, began to negotiate the conditions of a federal system. The international community was split on how to respond, and the regional actors—Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Gulf states—began to regroup for the next phase of the war.



1

Fall of Assad Regime

The Syrian Civil War began in 2011, with peaceful demonstrations against the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad. The regime was defined by authoritarian rule, a powerful security state, Ba'athist ideology, and sectarian favoritism that disproportionately empowered the Alawite minority while marginalizing Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and other ethnic and religious groups.

The government responded with violent acts which caused the situation to worsen and the conflict to escalate into a full scale civil war. Furthermore, the conflict drew major external players and transformed Syria into a battleground for proxy warfare. Russia, Iran and Hezbollah expressed their support towards the regime of Bashar al-Assad while Turkey, United States of America, Saudi Arabia and Qatar backed different rebel groups in Syria.

The reign under Bashar al-Assad faced many internal and external pressures. Russia, which was once a cornerstone of the regime's survival, significantly scaled its military presence in Syria due to increasing costs of its ongoing confrontation with NATO in Eastern Europe and mounting domestic discontent at home. Simultaneously, Iran began diverting attention to escalating tensions with Israel and internal economic crises, thereby reducing its operational involvement in Syria. Hezbollah, stretched thin by both regional engagements and domestic Lebanese instability, also began withdrawing fighters. The result was a sudden weakening of Assad's strategic depth, leaving his military exposed and poorly resourced.



There was a vacuum in support coincided with growing unrest across regime-held territories (cities such as Hama, Tartus, and Latakia, civilian demonstrations) , Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) initiated a bold offensive in early November 2024. On 5 November, HTS forces rapidly captured Maarat al-Numan and Saraqib, severing key portions of the M5 highway and cutting off crucial supply routes. On 9 November, they seized Khan Sheikhoun, further tightening their hold on Idlib province. These victories were highly symbolic and operationally decisive, marking the collapse of regime logistics in northern and central Syria. By 11 November, HTS-led fighters had taken Salamiyah, giving them a foothold into central Syria and isolating government forces in Hama. Local militias began surrendering en masse or fled toward the Alawite coastal enclave. These sweeping advances marked the first wave of the opposition's campaign to topple Assad.

The second wave of the offensive began on 27 November, 2024, with coordinated attacks on Homs, Damascus suburbs, and Aleppo. This wave was more organized and involved broader participation from Turkish-backed groups under the Syrian National Army (SNA) as well as independent rebel factions. The rapid collapse of Homs, followed by the encirclement of Damascus and the seizure of Aleppo on 30 November, was the culmination of this wave. The operation demonstrated an unprecedented level of coordination among previously fractured opposition groups and signaled the irreversible decline of the Assad regime.

The planning for an offensive attack by anti-Assad forces had started by 2023 but was delayed because of Turkish objections who sought to negotiate with the Assad government but received a negative response. On 7th December, 2024 the rebel forces completely secured



control of Homs after hours of military engagement. The collapse of the forces of the Assad government resulted in the withdrawal of security forces who destroyed sensitive documentation during their retreat. The capture granted insurgent forces control over critical transportation infrastructure, particularly the highway junction connecting Damascus to the Alawite coastal region, where both Assad's support base and Russian military installations were situated.

Syrian rebel forces, on the same day, declared that they had begun the final phase of encircling Damascus, following the capture of several strategic towns surrounding the capital. Rebel commander Hassan Abdel Ghani confirmed that their units had initiated operations to isolate Damascus after successfully taking control of Al-Sanamayn, a town located approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) south of the city. By the evening, pro-government troops had withdrawn from key positions in the capital's periphery, including Jaramana, Qatana, Muadamiyat al-Sham, Darayya, Al-Kiswah, Al-Dumayr, Daraa, and areas near the Mezzeh Air Base.

The Assad regime fell on 8th December, 2024 following a ten day offensive by the rebel forces which started on 27th November, 2024. Three days later, the opposition fighters took over Aleppo (the second largest city in Syria). Some groups that took over this operation were HTS, National Front for Liberation, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Izza and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, as well as Turkish-backed factions that fall under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army/Free Syrian Army.

The Syrian opposition is currently as of 2024, divided into three main axes. HTS, along with its allies, the Syrian National Army supported by Türkiye, and the Kurdish forces in Northeastern Syria.



FUTURISTIC TIMELINE



30th November, 2024: Rebel forces captured major cities Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city, which delivered a symbolic and strategic blow to the forces of Assad. Prior to that, Hama and Idlib had also fallen under rebel control, following intense but brief engagements in late November.

7th December, 2024: On 7th December, Rebel forces led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham marched into Damascus with nearly no resistance. The fall of the Ba'athist Government seems inevitable.

8th December, 2024: In the early hours of the morning, President Bashar Hafez al-Assad flees out of Damascus (Syria) with his family to Moscow (Russia) where he is granted political asylum. The regime of President Bashar Hafez al-Assad collapses, marking the end of over five decades of authoritarian rule in Syria. Rebel factions led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seize control of key Syrian territories, including Damascus. The Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa declared the formation of a new transitional government for the governance of New Syria which pledged to stabilize the country, establish inclusive governance and pursue democratic elections.

10th December, 2024: Ahmed al-Sharaa addresses the world as the de-facto ruler and representative of Syria and elaborates on plans to integrate and organize the several different factions under a single banner to unify Syria. He also calls upon different armed forces to lay down their weapons and unite under a single force for the development of the country. At the same time, Ahmed al-Sharaa also rejects all accusations of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's links to renowned extremist organizations active in the Syrian area, such as the Al Qaeda



affiliate Al-Nusra Front. Ahmed al-Sharaa claims that HTS exists as an independent entity which fights for the people of Syria and does not believe in the extremist jihadi policies

6th January, 2025: The transitional government of Syria led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is recognized by the Arab League as the representative of the Syrian people. Similarly, in the 20th Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], the Syrian Arab Republic's membership to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is reinstated after the topic is raised in the Council by Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia.

18th January, 2025: The Trump Administration removes economic sanctions on Syria and the European Union follows it. President Donald Trump pushes the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], their key past allies, to join hands with the HTS group to lead a new peaceful Syria. The United States of America also begins to send diplomats to Northern Syria to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) government to convince the SDF to join forces with the Transitional Government.

11th February, 2025: After months of negotiations, in a historic and unexpected political shift, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) forms a coalition with the Syrian Salvation Government [SSG] of the HTS to join the Transitional Government of Syria [TGS]. Ahmed al-Sharaa is given the position of the President of this Transitional Government with Farhad Abdi Shaheen, the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF] who is to be given the position of Vice President. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria territories are officially integrated into HTS-controlled regions, and the coalition proclaims the establishment



of a restructured Syrian Arab Republic. As part of the agreement, the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF] are absorbed into the newly unified national army, signaling a temporary end to years of Kurdish-Arab tension and a move toward centralized governance. All parts of Syrian Territory under the control of the HTS rebels such as the provinces of Idlib, Damascus and parts of Aleppo are now under the Transitional Government of Syria with Sharaa as the supreme authority. Turkey supported factions of the Free Syrian Army and its political wing, the Interim government of Syria who refused to be a part of this coalition. This marked the point of deterioration of relations between the Interim Government of the Free Syrian Army [FSA] and the Transitional Government of the HTS and allied groups. The Interim Government continued to govern parts of Syria controlled and occupied by Turkish and FSA forces such as the provinces of Afrin, Tel Abyad and Northern Aleppo.

12th February, 2025: Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan gives out a joint statement with Abdurrahman Mustafa, the acting Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Syria. Erdogan condemns the HTS administration for joining hands with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and also talks about the direct threat posed by this new administration to the security and integrity of Türkiye. At the end of his speech, Erdogan states “Kürt militanlar ve cihatçı eşkıyalar tarafından yönetilen bir terör devletini asla tanımayacağız. Suriye’nin geleceği, aşırılar tarafından yazılamaz.” i.e Turkey shall not recognise this Transitional Government run by Kurdish terrorists and jihadists and only the Interim Government can be considered as the true representatives of the Syrian people.

15th February, 2025: The Turkish Foreign Ministry persistently voiced Turkey’s positions across all possible international platforms,



including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations and all other international conferences. Turkey continues reiterating their support for the Interim Government which now existed separately from the rest of Syria along the Turkish Syrian border.

20th February, 2025: Turkey hands over the Turkish occupied parts of Syria to the Interim Government to be administered by them freely, however Turkish troops, despite requests from the HTS administration, remain stationed in the Afrin, Tel Abyad regions for “national security”.

27th February, 2025: Turkey’s policy towards the Transitional Government brings them into a disagreement with the United States of America. The USA urges Turkey to stop their support for the Interim Government and promote the coalition of all the factions in Syria into a single group while Turkey remains adamant.

20th March, 2025: The Israeli Armed Forces launched a series of coordinated airstrikes targeting the United Nations established demilitarized zones around the Golan Heights, citing the collapse of the Assad regime as nullifying the existing demilitarization agreements that were made with Damascus. Israel declared that these zones no longer held any legal protections, framing the strikes as a preemptive measure of self-defense against potential threats from the newly formed Syrian Transitional Government, which they accused of harboring hostile militant groups. Following the airstrikes, Israeli forces moved to establish control over strategic positions within these buffer zones, significantly altering the military landscape along the Israel-Syria border. This operation heightened tensions in the region, drawing condemnation from the Transitional Government of Syria



and alarm from international actors concerned about further escalation.

28th March, 2025: The Transitional Government of Syria [TGS] announces the cancellation of planned general elections, declaring that elections would be postponed until a new constitution was drafted and ratified. The government justified this decision by emphasizing the need for constitutional reforms before holding nationwide polls and also due to national security reasons pertaining to the Israeli attacks on Southern Syria. A transitional period is declared for 1 year, during which a new constitution will be drafted. Concurrently, a new People's Constituent Assembly was established, granting it full legislative authority; however, its members were largely controlled by the Transitional Government, with two-thirds appointed by a presidential committee and the remaining one-third directly chosen by the president. During this transitional time period, Syria was to be administered by the full authority of the Transitional Government.

30th March, 2025: The Transitional government shifted its focus toward rebuilding and militarizing the Syrian Armed Forces, merging armed factions originating from HTS with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other rebel groups to create a unified Syrian Army. President Ahmed al-Sharaa proclaimed that Israel's attack on these demilitarized zones is a threat to the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic and that Israel is taking advantage of the weak political and military structure of Syria to expand their territory. He justified that during the time period where the new Constitution is being made, it is of utmost importance that the Syrian Armed Forces are strengthened and prepared to counter such threats to the Syrian Arab Republic's security.



“Syrian Arab Republic is built on peace, but if someone threatens our sovereignty, we will not stand back in protecting our lands” -

President Ahmed al-Sharaa

2nd April, 2025: The Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia support the Transitional Government in its plans. They condemn the Israeli takeover of buffer zones and call it an “Israeli invasion”. Saudi Arabia along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) enters into arms trade agreement with the coalition. They provide heavy weaponry to the Transitional Government for building up a unified Syrian Armed Force.

5th April, 2025: The cancellation of elections sparked protests and political unrest across several Syrian cities, but the transitional government suppressed these demonstrations under the pretext of protecting national security amid ongoing threats. This move deepened divisions within Syria, further alienating opposition groups and international observers advocating for democratic processes.

10th April, 2025: A massive buildup of Syrian troops was observed along the Syrian-Israeli border, particularly near the Golan Heights, signaling a sharp escalation in tensions. The Transitional Government of Syria [TGS], bolstered by the recent merger of HTS and SDF factions into the Syrian Army and its intensified militarization efforts and arms deals, deploys thousands of soldiers and heavy weaponry to the frontier. This military concentration was widely interpreted as a show of force in response to Israeli airstrikes in March and Israel’s recent takeover of demilitarized zones. Israel responds with heightened alert and military readiness, resulting in a tense standoff marked by frequent patrols, reconnaissance flights, and warnings from both sides. The increased militarization raised fears of a



potential outbreak of hostilities, destabilizing an already fragile region.

11th April, 2025: The United States of America calls for immediate retreat by both the parties and offers to mediate the conflict between Israel and Syria.

12th July, 2025: Exploiting the political instability and divided control of the Syrian Transitional Government, several extremist factions affiliated with the previous Al Nusra Front, increase their activity along the volatile Syrian-Iraqi border. These Salafi-jihadist factions wanted to take over Syria and establish a global caliphate, governed by Sharia Law. These extremist groups were a coalition of different extremist factions of the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ansar al-Islam, Jund al-Sham etc that believed in the principles of Al-Qaeda and opposed the HTS administration's policies. The coalition organized itself broadly under the group 'Hurra al-Din' with Muhammad Salah, a rebel previously affiliated with Jabhat Fatah al-Nusra, being their leader. Ahmed al-Sharaa's policies had caused a major fallout between the extremist wings of Jabhat Fatah al-Nusra and the HTS, these groups launched coordinated attacks targeting both military and civilian sites of the Transitional Government in North Western Syria, sparking a sudden escalation in terrorism across the region. Clashes between militants and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) intensified, particularly in northern Syria, as the Syrian Armed Forces sought to contain the extremist threat. This surge in violence compounded the region's already dire conditions, with widespread poverty, soaring unemployment rates, and a collapsing economy pushing many communities to the brink of humanitarian disaster. The growing insecurity further undermined efforts toward stabilization and reconstruction.



20th July, 2025: A sudden attack by the Hurras al-Din saw the strategic city of Deir-ez-Zor, a previous ISIS stronghold being taken over by the Hurras al-Din militants. ISIS was a direct competitor of Al-Qaeda, however joint operations by the US allies and the Syrian Democratic Forces had nearly wiped out ISIS. The Hurras al-Din, now supported by the militants from various other factions like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham controlled several parts of Eastern and Southern Syria, extending from Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal to the Quneitra Villages.

22nd July, 2025: The Syrian Armed Forces armed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were deployed to take back the city of Deir-ez-Zor. Despite repeated offensive strikes, the Syrian Armed Forces jointly with the Syrian Democratic Forces, were unable to drive out the Hurras al-Din rebels from the region. Hurras al-Din pushed the Syrian Armed Forces to Raqqa, and even managed to capture more key surrounding areas during this time period.

27th November, 2025: Ahmed al-Sharaa, President of the Syrian Arab Republic and leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, was killed in a devastating bombing in the Idlib region. While en route to the Syrian Armed Forces' military base in Idlib, his 12-vehicle convoy was struck near the town of Maarrat Misrin. A 17-year-old boy, Ashfaq Fihrrulla, drove a motorcycle packed with explosives directly into the president's vehicle, detonating on impact and killing six people, including himself and al-Sharaa. The Hurras al-Din claimed responsibility for the assassination, describing it as a message to the Transitional Government. The warning is believed to reflect growing anger within hardline jihadist factions over HTS's perceived betrayal of global jihadist principles, including its cooperation with Kurdish forces, moves toward governance, and openness to international negotiations.



29th November, 2025: Farhad Abdi Shaheen, the Kurdish leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Vice President of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Transitional Government is sworn in as the acting President of Syrian Arab Republic. Using his powers as President, Farhad Abdi Shaheen brings in more Kurdish officials into the Transitional Government and a power shift is seen as now power is concentrated in the hands of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria government, rather than the HTS officials.

29th November, 2025: The United States of America, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States criticize this assassination, reiterating their condolences for the loss suffered by Syria. They also reiterate their support for the Transitional Government of Syria, accepting Farhad Abdi Shaheen as the new legitimate President of Syria for the transitional period.

30th November, 2025: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a statement regarding this assassination claims that the SDF was behind the attack. He claimed that Farhad Abdi Shaheen was the mastermind behind this assassination and called the assassination a plot by the Kurdish terrorists to take over the entirety of Syria. He also claimed that now the Transitional Government could not be considered as the representatives of the Syrian people in any way whatsoever.

July-December, 2025: The Syrian Armed Forces were stretched thin and scattered throughout Syria. There were massive troop deployments along the Southern Syrian-Israeli border due to tensions along with considerable troops being deployed in the North at the border with the Turkish occupied regions under the administration of the rival Interim Government. Tensions were at an all time high as



many troops, especially SDF units were deployed in the Eastern parts to attack key Hurras al-Din and other terror groups outposts. No Syrian Armed Forces base was safe as key military and civilian strongholds were often struck by sudden attacks from the extremist rebels. Although the USA and Saudi Arabia criticized Turkey and Israel, while also pledging to help the Transitional Government in fighting these terrorist threats, no country directly intervened in the conflict due to its vicious nature. USA, although alerted by this rising power of Al-Qaeda affiliates, remained uninterested in becoming actively involved in Syria and instead substituted its military involvement by sending diplomats and military equipment to the Syrian Armed Forces to counter these extremist threats. It is estimated that the Hurras al-Din along with the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham had abundant amount of resources obtained through the huge amounts of weaponry and ammunition that Turkey, Saudi Arabia etc had provided to the rebel groups in the past to use against the Assad Government along with weapons recovered from old ISIL and Al-Nusra Front bases which now stood abandoned. The new President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Farhad Abdi Shaheen claimed that the Hurras al-Din and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham were secretly being funded by Turkey and Qatar to destabilize the Syrian Arab Republic. The United States of America continued supporting the Transitional Government of Syria despite Turkish protests and condemnation, further spoiling relations with Ankara.

5th December , 2025: A devastating terrorist attack on a major Syrian Democratic Forces base [now known as the Syrian Armed Forces]—in the Raqqa region resulted in the deaths of over 60 Syrian soldiers, along with six U.S. diplomats and two American military personnel. The U.S. personnel had been stationed at the facility to oversee the transfer of American military aid to the Syrian Armed



Forces. This base had served as a critical logistics hub for the reception and distribution of U.S. military supplies. The attack sent shockwaves through the U.S. Department of Defense, prompting strong condemnation and widespread outrage. It significantly heightened American concerns over Syria's deteriorating security environment and fueled calls within Washington to bolster military and diplomatic support for the Transitional Syrian Government and the restructured Syrian Armed Forces. Among those killed was Tom Barrack, the U.S. Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic and former ambassador to Turkey. His death, along with the loss of other American personnel, deeply rattled the Trump administration, forcing a reassessment of its broader Syria policy. The incident served as a wake-up call for the United States—an urgent reminder that Syria was once again becoming a dangerous breeding ground for terrorism, operating beyond the reach of international oversight.

December, 2025: In the 2025 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the People's Republic of China is granted observer status in the Organisation after consensus from the entire Council. The motion to grant China this status was raised by Hakan Fidan, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, supported by the ministers of Pakistan, Iran, Qatar and some other member states.

12th January, 2026: The Trump administration officially unveiled a new policy on Syria, committing to provide direct financial assistance, weapons, and intelligence support to both the Syrian Transitional Government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Although the U.S. military had largely pulled out of Syria in 2018, over 1,500 American troops were once again deployed, this time stationed at Syrian Armed Forces bases in the Raqqa and



Al-Hasakah regions. This marked a renewed U.S. entry into Syria's complex conflict landscape after years of cautious distance. Following the policy announcement, U.S. armored vehicles began reappearing in the area. In a press statement, President Donald Trump sparked controversy by declaring, *"American citizens have shouldered Europe's defense burden for too long. This ends now. Europe must learn to fund its own protection rather than relying on the U.S."* This statement coincided with a significant reallocation of U.S. defense funds, including major reductions in America's financial contributions to NATO's defense budget. The move drew strong condemnation from Turkey, which accused the U.S. of backing Kurdish separatist groups—leading to an unprecedented deterioration in U.S.-Turkey relations. It also triggered tensions within NATO itself, as numerous member nations voiced concern over the United States' unilateral handling of regional security matters.

February, 2026: The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine's counter attack had by now completely died down. The Russian Ukrainian war had ended in a stalemate where Russia continued to occupy several parts of Eastern Ukraine, while cities of Kyiv remained under control of the Ukrainian command. Although no proper ceasefire agreement was signed between the countries, all fighting had died down.

1st April, 2026: The Transitional Government of Syria, after months of military build up along the Syrian-Israeli border signs a monumental non-aggression agreement with the Israeli Government brokered by the USA which came to be called the **As-salam fir Suriya**. The Syrian Government was already facing security and safety issues due to the rising power of the Hurras al-Din along the Syrian-Iraqi/Jordanian border, hence they agreed to give up the



United Nations created buffer zones to Israel as a friendly gesture and under pressure from the United States of America, President Farhad Abdi Shaheen orders the withdrawal of all Syrian troops from the Israel-Syria buffer zone.

6th May, 2026: The Parliamentary elections of Lebanon take an unexpected turn. In a surprise move out of the 128 seats in the Lebanese Parliament, 81 are taken by completely new faces, with most of the previous MPs losing their seats. Rumors fly around of many of the new MPs being elected due to the support of the Hezbollah group. Many politicians, considered to be closely affiliated to the Hezbollah political party such as Ex-Health Minister Mohammad Jawad Khalifeh suddenly find themselves as newly elected Members of the Parliament. After the Parliamentary elections, during the election for the Prime Minister, the favourite candidate Nawaf Salam loses the election to Talal Hamieh . Although Talal Hamieh had no direct relations with Hezbollah, yet according to international media, he was suspected to be closely affiliated to the Hezbollah political group. There was a clear change in the policy of the new administration with instances of the government turning a blind eye to the activities of Hezbollah rebels inside Lebanese borders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even went on to the new government as a puppet of Hezbollah with Israeli-Lebanese relations hitting an all time low.

3rd July, 2026: Israel claims that in an air strike on a Hezbollah base in Eastern Lebanon, Iranian Minister of Defense, General Aziz Zadeh is killed along with other top leaders of Hezbollah who had gathered for a secretive meeting. Israel also claims that UAV surveillance had shown several similar trucks entering Lebanon through Hurras al-Din controlled Lebanese-Syrian border. These trucks were suspected of



originating from Iran and carrying advanced weaponry, including ballistic missiles, assault rifles and other heavy weaponry.

6th July, 2026: Hezbollah fighters launch hundreds of missiles targeting Israeli Military bases in the North. The Israeli Iron Dome system manages to deflect most missiles, however despite the defensive systems, many military bases are hit.

7th July, 2026: Israel launches a retaliatory attack on Hezbollah, ground forces are deployed to the Israeli-Lebanese border. The Lebanese Government gives Israel a severe warning that if Israeli troops enter Lebanon it will be a threat to Lebanon's security. The Lebanese Army is deployed and reports emerge of the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah fighters fighting side by side in the region.

10th July, 2026: Iran launches over 200 missiles towards Israeli occupied regions of Palestinian West Bank. Along with this, in a surprising resurgency an estimated 400 rebel fighters [suspected to enter West Bank from Jordan] attack Israeli strongholds in the West Bank. Israeli Defence Forces suffer key losses in this coordinated surprise attack and Israel mobilizes its full military. Violent Palestinian protests start all across the West Bank while key Israeli Defense Forces bases are taken over by rebels.

15th July, 2026: The Syrian Transitional government finally declares the end of the 1 year transitional period and formally adopts a new permanent constitution. The document includes several controversial provisions that centralize power and reshape governance structures, sparking intense debate within Syria and among international observers. Following this, the Transitional Government officially



announces that general elections will be held in November 2026, aiming to move towards democracy and political normalisation.

10th December, 2026: The results of the November elections are declared. The Transitional government wins by a landslide majority, consolidating its control over Syria's political landscape. However, the Interim Government immediately denounces the elections as rigged, alleging widespread manipulation, voter suppression, and intimidation tactics. International reactions remain mixed, with some states cautiously recognizing the results while others condemn the process.

17th December, 2026: Upon the request of their allies USA and Israel, the Transitional Government [now the Syrian Government] deploys troops along the Syrian Lebanese Border near Golan Heights to support the Israeli troops in case of a Lebanese/Hezbollah attack. Although no official statement is made, the intent is clear.

20th January, 2027: In response to the election outcome and ongoing grievances, Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions launch coordinated armed operations against the Transitional Government's forces from the Afrin and Northern Aleppo region. Simultaneously, mass rallies and protests guided by Interim opposition leaders erupt in multiple cities across Syria. The Transitional Government, now considered to be the proper Syrian Government, declares a state of emergency. Using the Syrian Armed Forces, they initiate a harsh crackdown, arresting opposition figures and suppressing dissent. The country becomes deeply polarized, with loyalties divided sharply between the different governments, each claiming Syria to be their own.

30th January, 2027: The world is divided on the Syrian conflict with many countries supporting the Transitional Government, while others



claiming the legitimacy of the Interim Government. Although the European Union led by the USA sides with the Transitional Government, yet Turkey's opposing stance leads to a number of countries getting involved in the matter. The USA however pledges military support to the Transitional Government to fight against these rebels. The Syrian Armed Forces, backed by the USA and Saudi Arabia launch offensive missions in Aleppo. Farhad Abdi Shaheen declared that the Interim Government was trying to destroy the peace which had been restored in Syria after so long and hence needed to be taken down. He called the Interim Government a puppet of Turkey and a threat to the future of Syria.

February, 2027: The Israel-Lebanese tensions had died down. Although there continued a massive troop buildup along the border with occasional skirmishes between Israeli/Syrian and Hezbollah troops no proper invasion had taken place. Israel manages to take down the resurgence movement in the West Bank after months of strategic operations. Iranian-Israeli relations remain tense, however Iran shifts its focus from Israel to the growing threat of Saudi Arabian influence in the Middle East. Jordan and Iraq had signed oil deals with Saudi Arabia and the latter also had excellent relations with the Transitional Government of Syria. Iran's influence in the Middle East was declining and declining fast. Something needed to be done.

26th February, 2027: Turkey strongly condemns the imprisonment of exile government leaders and the ongoing state of emergency. Ankara issues direct threats of military intervention, citing concerns over Kurdish empowerment and human rights abuses. Diplomatic efforts led by the United States to mediate the escalating crisis fail, as deep disagreements between Washington and Ankara widen U.S.-Turkey relations. US-Turkey relations, although already at an all time low due



to the USA's unwavering support for the Transitional Government and USA's drift with NATO, reach their breaking point. USA under its NATO policy had reduced their defence spending for most of the European nations, including Turkey.

11th March, 2027: Iranian ballistic missiles enter into Syrian airspace and bomb the city of Homs and Hama. Hezbollah fighters cross the Eastern Lebanese border and attack the port city of Tartus while advancing towards Homs, taking the fight directly to the Syrian Armed Forces.

6th April, 2027: United States fighter jets conduct bombing raids throughout Syria. They bomb regions of Northern Aleppo and the Deir-ez-Zor region. Following this bombing, the Syrian Armed Forces launched a huge offensive in Aleppo against the Free Syrian Army forces. In a day the FSA was driven out of Aleppo, a key stronghold of the Interim Government. US bombings destroy key FSA bases and render the FSA incapable of launching any offensives.

12th May, 2027: China re-entered the Syrian region with strategic infrastructure investments, as a part of its Belt and Roads Initiative, particularly in Aleppo, Raqqa, and Idlib at the end of 2026. A field operations center focused on developing, testing, and maintaining advanced infrastructure monitoring systems like sensors, drones, and AI-powered software to oversee the condition and security of roads, railways, bridges, and pipelines were built along the BRI routes in northeastern Syria. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) carries out a malicious cyber operation and steals data, then forges emails showing Kurdish officials secretly sharing sensitive information with China. TIP publishes the forged documents to international media, posing as a Kurdish whistleblower group to frame the Kurdish government.



China suspects Kurdish intelligence factions deliberately provided data to TIP. Fearing security breaches and international backlash, China halts BRI operations and sends an investigation team. Turkey backs China's stance, accusing the Kurds of enabling ethnic surveillance and destabilizing the region. China and Turkey form a joint security pact to "contain extremist threats" and protect BRI assets. The Kurdish government denies all accusations, calling it a false-flag cyber attack aimed at discrediting them.

15th May, 2027: Turkey signs a major defence deal with Russia and China. Russia is given control of one of the ports near Latakia, under control of the FSA. China also started funding the Free Syrian Army along with Turkey and Qatar to rebuild their defenses against the Syrian Government and also for conducting attacks on strategic Turkistan Islamic Party [TIP] bases. With this inflow of new weaponry and funds from a global superpower, the Free Syrian Army was able to gradually improve and rebuild, after the devastating losses in Aleppo. The Syrian Armed Forces had captured Aleppo, but Turkish occupation of Afrin disallowed them from pushing the FSA any further. The Syrian Armed Forces were also fighting Hezbollah fighters in Homs and the extremist threats in Raqqa which further forced them to stand and watch as the FSA rebuilt itself.

22nd May, 2027: In what seemed like a repeat of history, by now despite US bombings and Syrian Armed Forces counter attacks, the Hurras al-Din had captured key cities of Al-Bukamal, Ash-Shaddadi and Al-Suwar along the Syrian-Iraqi border. The Iraqi government had allowed the USA to conduct limited operations from their territory, however in itself seemed disinterested in countering this threat. Although there were occasional instances of Hurras al-Din attacking US bases in Iraq or Iraqi territory, the Iraqi government



turned a blind eye to them and instead focused on ensuring that the Hurras al-Din remained contained in Syria.

22nd July, 2027: During an official meeting, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf demanded the immediate release of six Algerian nationals affiliated with the Polisario Front, who have been detained without charge by the armed faction known as the New Syrian Forces (NSF)—a paramilitary group aligned with the Syrian Transitional Government but operating with semi-autonomous command structures in northeastern Syria. According to a classified briefing leaked to the Algerian press, the individuals were detained while allegedly transiting through Kurdish-held territory en route to a diplomatic conference in Iraq. Reports indicate that they were interrogated under duress, denied consular access, and subjected to physical force. In an emergency session of the Algerian National Assembly, the government issued a formal condemnation of the Syrian authorities for failing to ensure due process and for allowing armed factions under its jurisdiction to detain foreign nationals without trial.

23rd July, 2027: USA enters into a new agreement with the Syrian Government and stations a fleet of 24 F22 Fighter Jets in US Army bases in the Raqqa region. The USA also stationed 1000 more soldiers in Syria. Under the agreement, the US accompanied by European Nations will conduct air and ground operations to take down Hurras al-Din strongholds in Eastern Syria.

July, 2027: The Syrian Government after months of attacks from all fronts finally now only has a single entity to deal with, which is Hezbollah attacking Syria from Homs. The FSA is too weak to launch any offensives and the US military operations have broken Hurras al-Din's strength. Hence President Farhad Abdi Shaheen launched an



all-out offensive along the Western Front. With the help of Saudi Arabia provided weapons and coordinated Israeli airstrikes, within days Hezbollah fighters which had entered into Syria were pushed back. The Syrian Armed Forces sweep through Tartus destroying Hezbollah resistance with advanced weaponry and higher manpower, heading for the Lebanese border.

August, 2027: Hezbollah troops are pushed back to the Lebanese border and new defensive bases are set up by the Syrian Armed Forces along the border. The border is heavily militarized with Lebanon facing Israeli and Syrian military on either side. The Syrian Government sets up surface to air missile launchers and artillery systems along the Syrian-Lebanese border to prevent another Hezbollah invasion. The Lebanese Government turns a blind eye to the Hezbollah invasion of Syria and instead condemn the Syrian Government for its armament along the border. The Lebanese Government warns that any incursion into Lebanon by the HTS could mean war and begins stationing more troops along the Eastern border.

The July counterattacks from the Syrian Armed Forces had driven out Hezbollah fighters from Syria completely and several key Hezbollah operating bases along the border had been rendered useless by Israeli coordinated drone strikes. Israel and Syria had broken the backbone of Hezbollah and forced them into retreating. At this time Iran began heavily increasing its support to Hezbollah. Iran launched missile strikes along the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli borders targeting areas captured by Syrian troops as Israel's top notch air defence system made any such attack useless. Syrian troops, although protected by Surface to Air missiles from the USA and Saudi Arabia still suffered heavy losses. Syrian Armed Forces after weeks of such strikes were



forced to retreat from the border creating a buffer zone between Syria and Lebanon.

18th September, 2027: Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) a group designated as a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, is assassinated under mysterious circumstances. His death sends shockwaves through Kurdish communities and militant groups across the region.

2nd October, 2027: Following Öcalan's assassination, there is a sudden and dramatic surge in PKK-related terrorist attacks inside Turkey. Abdullah Öcalan had been calling for peace between Turkey and Kurdistan for years now and it was due to his guidance that there existed a peace period of Kurdish terrorism in Turkey from 2012 with no major uprising except during the Siege of Kobani in 2016. Öcalan's assassination spiked what is now referred to as the Fourth PKK insurgency in Turkey. Hardline leaders of the PKK blamed the assassination on the Government and called upon the Kurdish people to unite in the fight against the Turkish Government. For the past couple of years, with the SDF coming in power in the neighbouring country and Iraqi Kurds getting their rights from the Iraqi Government, a feeling of dissent was forming among the Kurdish communities in Turkey, especially with President Erdogan's statements and actions against the Kurdish Government in Syria. The assassination of their beloved leader and promoter of peace, Abdullah Öcalan was the final straw. The violence targeted military installations, infrastructure, and government officials, plunging Turkey into heightened internal security tensions.

3rd October, 2027: Turkey blames the assassination on the SDF and the Kurdish controlled government of Syria and calls it a plot by the Syrian Government to break the Turkish-PKK peace process. Yet,



they deploy Turkish Armed Forces [TAF] throughout the country with special emphasis on Kurdish majority regions, cracking down upon violent rioters as well as peaceful protestors. In one instance, the Turkish Armed Forces fired tear gas upon a crowd of 1800 Kurdish civilians who had gathered in a peaceful candle march in Ankara in Abdullah Öcalan's honour, mistaking it as an anti-government rally.

30th October, 2027: The Syrian Government after nearly 10 months, lifts the state of emergency from the country. The Syrian Government had promised economic development and a peaceful Syria. It showed the public a picture of better quality of life and stability in the future. However the public was growing impatient. All that the Transitional Government's policies had brought Syria in the last couple of years was further fragmentation and war. Syria's economy was in shambles with dire need of humanitarian aid. More than 1 million refugees that had been displaced in the Syrian Civil War had returned to the country in this period, only to suffer from lack of resources. The loyalty which the HTS had earned in taking down the Assad Regime was dying- and dying fast. As soon as the emergency was lifted there were instances of public protests in Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus.

27th December, 2027: Turkey had through its harsh crackdown policies managed to control and monitor mobs. However, the biggest threat to Turkey now were militants from PKK's armed wing HPG [People's Defense Forces]. Along with the protests and riots, terrorist activities by the PKK included bombings, attacks on TAF convoys and bases etc. In retaliation, Turkey launches large-scale military operations against Kurdish armed groups based in northern Iraq as well as PKK Turkish strongholds near Qandil mountains and Sirnak province. Coordinated airstrikes and covert ground operations are carried out jointly by Turkish and Syrian forces targeting PKK and



allied militia strongholds. The escalation further destabilizes the border region and intensifies conflicts involving Kurdish factions in both Syria and Iraq. Turkey also starts increasing deployment of troops in Syria calling it a defensive requirement. They accuse the SDF coalition government of promoting and funding the PKK attacks in Turkey.

17th March, 2028: A devastating suicide bombing near the Hagia Sophia rocks Istanbul, killing over 40 civilians, 12 tourists and injuring many more. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) swiftly attributes the attack to the PKK, accusing the group of orchestrating the violence with direct support and coordination from YPG units operating inside northeastern Syria. The incident shocks the nation, fueling widespread fear and outrage among the Turkish public and hardening the government's stance on Kurdish militant groups. The Hagia Sophia bombing was the redefining moment of Turkey's policy. Turkey till this moment had only been involved in the conflicts in Syria indirectly, however it was time for actions to be taken. The growing strength of the Kurdish Government in Syria had allowed YPG and PKK militants to operate out of Syria and had led to this attack. This strength needed to be crushed.

18th March, 2028: Turkey starts secretly building up its military resources in the Afrin region, readying its military for invading operations. Turkey through its defence agreement with China and Russia draws heavy weaponry including state of the art ballistic missiles, armoured vehicles etc while also increasing its funding for the FSA by 200%. Turkey signed a deal to purchase 12 Su-57 aircrafts from Russia which were sent to Turkey within a week. Russia also deploys the Wagner Group to the naval ports controlled by Russia near Latakia.



29th March, 2028: In response to the Istanbul attack, Turkey launches Operation Socrates, a major military offensive aimed at crippling Kurdish armed groups along the Syrian border. Turkish Armed Forces, supported by allied Syrian militias, cross into northeastern Syria, targeting several key Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and YPG bases. The operation quickly gained ground, with Turkish forces seizing control of numerous Kurdish-controlled towns and villages, destabilizing the region further and displacing thousands of civilians. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the United States adopted a cautious yet increasingly assertive policy toward Syria. Initially hesitant to fully engage with the new Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led transitional government due to its extremist origins, Washington maintained indirect diplomatic contact while closely monitoring developments. The political landscape shifted dramatically in February 2025, when the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) entered a power-sharing coalition with HTS, establishing a Transitional Government of Syria (TGS). This move, which elevated SDF commander Farhad Abdi Shaheen to the vice presidency, offered the U.S. a strategic opportunity to counterbalance both extremist and Iranian influence while preserving its long-standing partnership with the Kurdish forces. Although wary of HTS, the U.S. interpreted the unification as a pathway toward stability, supporting the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army and cautiously engaging with the new governing authority. Tensions escalated in December 2025 after a terror attack killed two U.S. soldiers embedded with the SDF, prompting a decisive shift in U.S. policy. In January 2026, the administration formally announced a new strategy that prioritized direct military and financial support to the SDF and the Transitional Government of Syria. This included arms shipments, funding, and training operations framed under



counterterrorism efforts. To enable this reallocation of resources, the U.S. reduced its financial commitments to NATO, a controversial move that fractured alliance cohesion and severely strained relations with Turkey. Ankara condemned American support for the Kurdish-led forces, accusing the U.S. of enabling separatist terrorism, and diplomatic relations between the two NATO allies plunged to historic lows. As Kurdish influence grew and Turkish hostility intensified—particularly after the assassination of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 2027 and Turkey’s subsequent military operations in northern Syria—the U.S. found itself entangled in a widening regional crisis. Washington strongly condemned Turkish incursions, warning of the destabilizing impact on anti-terror efforts and Syrian sovereignty. Throughout 2028, the United States pursued a policy of militarily directly supporting Kurdish-aligned forces. Nevertheless, by the end of the period, America had established itself as a central actor in Syria’s post-Assad future—militarily entrenched, diplomatically committed, and increasingly at odds with traditional allies over the path to regional stability. Turkey justifies the operation as a necessary act of self-defense and a preventive measure against future attacks. The FSA, now rebuilt and supported by TAF soldiers, managed to launch a deadly offensive on Aleppo. The FSA troops in this offensive strike were able to capture Aleppo and parts of Northern Idlib in just 3 days while Turkish Armed Forces raided and destroyed Syrian Democratic Forces [now the Syrian Armed Forces] bases in Al-Hasakah and Manbij regions.

6th April, 2028: The Syrian Transitional Government issues a stern warning to Turkey, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory. The government declares that continued Turkish incursions will be considered acts of aggression, threatening severe military and diplomatic consequences. Tensions escalate



sharply as both sides mobilize forces along the border, with fears of a wider regional conflict growing.

14th April, 2028: Recognizing the danger of an all-out conflict in Syria, Saudi Arabia hosts the Tenth Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Delegates from member states convene with the urgent goal of de-escalating the crisis. The summit debates mechanisms for ceasefire enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and political dialogue between conflicting parties. While disagreements among regional powers and rival factions challenge consensus, the conference marks a crucial diplomatic attempt to stabilize the volatile situation and prevent further bloodshed in the Middle East.

MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT



The Republic of Türkiye

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Turkey has opposed the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its alliance with HTS who in turn, created the Transitional Government of Syria. Turkey has always supported the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), which is predominantly made up of FSA constituents, and does not recognize the collaboration with HTS and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. This was articulated on 12th February 2025 when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the new Transitional Government of 'Kurdish Terrorist Militants' and 'Jihadist' rule, labelling them a 'terror state' and vowing to never recognize them. Turkey's efforts at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and United Nations held on April 15, 2025, and thereafter, maintained this stance of consistently supporting the SIG and delegating any recognition of legitimacy of the Transitional Government of Syria.

Despite handing over Turkish-occupied Syrian territories to the Interim Government on 20th February 2025, Turkey has kept troops stationed in strategic areas such as Afrin and Tel Abyad, citing national security concerns and denying HTS control. Turkey's refusal to support the unified Syrian Armed Forces which has now incorporated the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has fueled tensions with the United States (USA), who had requested Turkish cooperation on 27th February 2025. Turkey's alleged continued funding and support for extremist factions like Hurras al-Din and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham has led to accusations by the Syrian government and its allies of destabilizing Syria and has further deepened its estrangement from the Transitional Government (July 2025 onward).



Turkey's condemnation of the Transitional Government intensified after Kurdish Vice President Farhad Abdi Shaheen assumed the post of acting presidency in November 2025, with the Turkish president Erdoğan accusing the Syrian Democratic Forces of orchestrating Ahmed al-Sharaa's assassination. Turkey declared the Transitional Government illegitimate and refused to recognize its authority. The announcement Trump made on 12 January 2026 regarding a new policy concerning Syria where he pledged direct financial aid, intelligence and weaponry to the SDF and Transitional Government of Syria incurred a historic dip in US-Turkey relations. Ankara accused the USA of facilitating Kurdish separatism and damaging the national security of Turkey. This also caused internal diplomatic tension in NATO as Trump, at the same time, curtailed America's contribution to NATO defense spending budgets which weakened transatlantic relations further.

In 2026 Turkey's regional strategy was designed based on the counter coalition opposing the Transitional Government of Syria and the Western policies towards Syria. The Transitional Government of Syria accuses Turkey of funding extremist groups Hurras al-Din and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham who, in the first half of 2026, escalated violence Su-25 strikes against the Syrian Armed Forces and critical infrastructure. While Ankara denied direct involvement, claim, the resurgent Salafi-jihadist violence of extremists was funded, at least in part, by arms that used to be procured from Turkey and Qatar, suggested that Ankara's backing of the anti-Assad rebel factions continued to destabilize Syria's east and southern regions.

Additionally, during the 2025 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the People's Republic of China was granted observer, Turkey's diplomatic activity



within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was remarkable diplomatically by sponsoring the People's Republic of China's successful application for observer status with the OIC. This action, supported by Pakistan, Iran, and Qatar, was an indication of Turkey's efforts to deepen geopolitical reach in multilateral relations for the purpose of checking U.S. leverage in the area.

Amid the escalating threats surrounding Turkey, it remained engrossed in its administered Syrian regions through the Interim Government and refused to reconcile with the Transitional Government of Syria. Even with Syria adopting a new constitution on July 15, 2026, with elections planned for November 2026, Turkey viewed the entire political scenario as a Kurdish attempt to assume control. Some months later, on December 10, 2026, Turkey publicly dismissed the Transitional Government of Syria's election results, reasserting its support for the rival Interim Government.

Turkey's involvement and interference in the Syrian conflict escalated Turkey's Involvement and Interference into the Syrian Conflict in 2027-2028. This started with their dispute towards the newly formed Transitional Government of Syria. From Turkey's perspective, the Transitional Government of Syria was a Kurdish-leaning HTS government that attempted to aggrandize its dominance over the area. On January 20, 2027 Turkey condemned the arrest of the Interim Government leaders by the Transitional Government of Syria and the imposition of a state of emergency. Conflicts worsened when Ankara made military intervention threats citing human empowerment and Kurdish fuels the threat for human rights. As diplomatic attempts were already made, U-Turkish relations further declined as U-S continued their support Towards Transitional Government of Syria which caused the withdrawal of NATO Defence Agreements with



Turkey. The conflict on May 12, 2027, triggered Turkey's Islam Party Cyber Attack Controversy relating to the fabricated accusation documents of Kurds spying on the Chinese Government China. Turkey Supported China accusing the Kurdish government of ethnic surveillance spying and aiding resulted in the formation of the joint security pact with China to fight extremist containment threats. Turkey on 15 May 2027 signed a Defense contract with Russia and China which enabled Russian control of the port located near Latakia and supplied Chinese and Turkish arms to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Turkey's occupation of Afrin restrained the further advancement of the Syrian Armed Forces while the government focused on fighting Hezbollah and other extremists in different regions.

The internal strife within Turkey escalated after the killing of Abdullah Ocalan on September 18th, 2027. This assassination incited a widespread Kurdish awakening which triggered what became known as The Fourth PKK Insurgency. Two weeks later, on October 2nd, 2027, the PKK resumed its violent attacks in Turkey, targeting both infrastructure and security forces. In response, the government intensified its crack down on both violent and peaceful Kurdish protests. For instance, on October 3, 2027, the Turkish Armed Forces violently dispersed a peaceful candlelight vigil in Ankara, which was misperceived as an anti-government rally. By the end of that year, December 27, 2027, Turkey commenced extensive military operations against PKK strongholds located in Northern Iraq, as well as in Kurdish-populated regions near the Qandil Mountains and Şırnak Province. Alongside Syrian forces, these operations were deemed by



Ankara as retaliation to rising incursions from within the borders. Meanwhile, Turkey continued to bolster its military presence in Northern Syria, accusing the SDF-controlled Transitional Government of Syria of the PKK of spearheading and supporting the Terrorist Governance Structure.

the suicide bombing attack around the Hagia Sophia, Istanbul stands as one of the most painful incidents in history. The Turkish government instantly put the blame on the PKK and accused the YPG militia group for orchestrating the suicide bombing attack. Immediately after, on the 18th of March 2028, Turkey set up a military base in Afrin, indicative of beginning a secret military campaign. Turkey, under defense treaties with Russia and China, received military aid which included 12 Su-57 planes from Russia, along with increasing funding for the FSA by 200% and deploying the Wagner group to the Russian-controlled naval base near Latakia. This contributed to the new Operation Socrates, proposed on the 29th of March 2028. Under this operation, the Turkish armed forces, with assistance from allied Syrian militants and an updated FSA, commandeered a full-scale invasion into North Eastern Syria. Following this, the Turkish military advanced towards capturing several Kurdish strongholds, leading the FSA to reclaim Idlib and Aleppo in a matter of 3 days. The Turkish government faced major backlash through the Transitional Government of Syria which gave out a formal warning, promising military intervention in response to Turkish soldiers occupying the Syrian borders. Saudi Arabia, realizing the potential outbreak of war, called for an emergency summit on the 14th of April in 2028.



Presence in Syria - Turkey currently controls various parts of Northern Syria including the Afrin Region, Aleppo, Northern Idlib, Al-Hasakah etc.

Syrian Arab Republic

The formation of the Transitional Government of Syria was a big deal because it brought together the Autonomous Administration of North



and East Syria and the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, creating a wide-reaching union of territory and politics that blended Kurdish and Arab regions that had been separate for a while. President Ahmed al-Sharaa was tapped to lead the country, with Farhad Abdi Shaheen from the SDF stepping in as Vice President on 11 February 2025. This unification also meant merging the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into a new Syrian Armed Forces, finally ending the long-standing division between Kurds and Arabs. After al-Sharaa was killed on 27 November 2025 by Hurras al-Din, Farhad Abdi Shaheen took over, which gave Kurdish political influence a big boost within the new government (28 November 2025). This shift made the governance style lean more toward the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, even while they kept working alongside the HTS military framework. Then, on March 28, 2025, they set up a new People's Constituent Assembly—mostly appointed members (two-thirds) and some directly elected by the president (one-third)—acting as the main legislative body during the transitional period. The government promised to get a new constitution done within a year, and they managed to officially approve it on 15 July 2026, along with announcing general elections. The elections in November 2026 ended with the Transitional Government winning big, announced officially on 10 December 2026, though the Opposition's Interim Government took a different stance, claiming there was electoral fraud.

The TGS has always taken threats like terrorism and insurgency very seriously, seeing them as existential dangers. After Hurras al-Din, a tough jihadist group opposed to HTS-Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria cooperation, was formed in July 2025 and then



seized Deir ez-Zor on the 20th, the Transitional Government responded with a strict anti-terror strategy. Even with multiple counterattacks on July 22, 2025, and support from the international community, the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) couldn't push back and regain the territory, showing how resilient extremist groups can be. Things escalated when a bombing on December 5, 2025, hit a military base in Raqqa, killing over 60 Syrian troops and eight U.S. personnel, including Ambassador Tom Barrack. That event pulled the U.S. further into the mix. In response, the Trump administration sent 1,500 troops and restarted aid programs on January 12, 2026, strengthening cooperation with the TGS. The TGS has accused Turkey and Qatar of secretly supporting Hurras al-Din to stir up trouble in Syria, with this claim made in December 2025. As a result, they keep a close eye on Turkish-controlled border areas and refuse to reconcile with the rival Interim Government, which Turkey supports. Facing threats from Hurras al-Din, Turkey-backed groups, and Israeli military strikes, the TGS focused on strengthening its military strength. On March 30, 2025, they created the Syrian Armed Forces by combining SDF, HTS, and former rebels, with heavy weaponry from Saudi Arabia and the UAE arriving in early April. There's been a strong military presence along the Israeli border near the Golan Heights since Israel started crossing into demilitarized zones back in March 2025. But recognizing internal vulnerabilities, the TGS agreed to a peace deal brokered by the U.S. with Israel on April 1, 2026, which involved pulling back from buffer zones to better handle eastern insurgencies. The government's approach is mainly defensive but also assertive, emphasizing military deterrence, regional teamwork, and safeguarding sovereignty. Deployment of troops along the Syrian Lebanese border on December 17, 2026, in coordination with Israeli and U.S. forces, reflects their alignment against Hezbollah and a



broader effort against Iran in the Levant. The TGS has firmly aligned itself with the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, getting weapons and diplomatic backing. After initially being cautious, the U.S. got more involved following the Raqqa base bombing in December 2025, leading to official policy support starting January 12, 2026. They completely reject any reconciliation with Turkey, especially after Turkey refused to recognize the TGS in February 2025 and continued supporting the rival Interim Government, which Turkey formally handed control of occupied zones in Syria to in late February. Iranian military actions are also a concern for the TGS, especially after Israel claimed in July 2026 that Iranian missiles were being smuggled through Hurras al-Din-controlled areas. The TGS has quietly supported Israeli defense measures without openly opposing Hezbollah but deploying forces along the Syrian-Lebanese border in December 2026 hints at some level of tacit cooperation with Israeli security efforts.

While the transitional government initially pushed back elections due to concerns over security and the need to revise the constitution (scheduled for March 28, 2025), they eventually kept their word and held national elections in November 2026 after a new constitution was adopted on July 15, 2026. Even though many countries and local groups were skeptical and pushed back against the process, the government sees these elections as a big step toward Syria's return to democratic life. The new constitution has concentrated a lot of power in the president's hands, giving him important authority. This move was aimed at creating stronger leadership to help the country heal from years of civil war, jihadist violence, and regional divisions.

In response to coordinated attacks by FSA factions and mass protests on January 20, 2027, the Syrian Transitional Government declared a



state of emergency to try to reestablish control of the chaos and maintain order across the country. This action was in response to protests erupting in a series of cities led by opposition, and armed FSA militants attacking government forces from fronts like that of Afrin and Northern Aleppo. The government regarded itself as the true representative of Syrian sovereignty after Assad, noting that it was the sole legitimate authority, dedicated to maintaining the country whole and intact. The international community was appealed to in the form of the US and Saudi Arabia to combat the rebellion. The U.S. committed military assistance on January 30, 2027, and hit FSA strongholds with response strikes, mainly across Aleppo. By the 6th of April, 2027, the military had succeeded in pushing FSA militants out of Aleppo, a huge victory for the government and seizing control of strategic ground. This was greatly thanks to U.S. air raids and joint Syrian military action. But the government did not push on into Afrin, as it was occupied by Turkey, to avoid having to fight a heavily armed neighbor face to face (as of May 15, 2027). Mid-2027 was to bring new challenges to the transitional government. Hezbollah raids from Lebanon meant heavy combat in Tartus and Homs on March 11, 2027. By July 2027, with the use of Saudi arms and air support from Israel, Syrian forces had succeeded in removing Hezbollah militants back to the Lebanese border by August. But sustained Iranian missile bombardment along the border and the creation of a buffer zone in late August underscored ongoing regional threats, underscoring the necessity of strong border defenses. Domestically, the government was strained, politically and economically. When they lifted the state of emergency on 30 October 2027, it was to assure the public things were returning to normal. But peace and prosperity were not to be, and protests broke out in Idlib, Aleppo, and Damascus soon afterward, driven by frustration with the economy and shortages,



mainly among the one million refugees returning home. The government admitted more humanitarian aid and infrastructure schemes were needed to stabilize the country. Internationally, Syria needed to balance a complex web of friends and enemies. The TIP cyberattacks and fake documents scandal on May 12, 2027, while not directly related to the government, spurred greater collaboration between China and Turkey against Kurdish groups, fuelling suspicion throughout the region. Soon afterward, Turkey signed a defense pact with Russia and China on May 15, further complicating the regional dynamics and straining the government's alliances. May 22, 2027, Hurras al-Din was actually making waves in eastern Syria, taking over key border towns. The U.S. and Syrian forces together joined forces for an operation. On July 22, 2027, the U.S. deployed a squadron of 24 F-22 fighters along with 1,000 troops into Raqqa. The efforts significantly weakened Hurras al-Din, and it gave the Syrian government a chance to turn their attention towards pushing back against Hezbollah. But things heated up when Turkey deployed its massive offensive, Operation Sokrates, on March 29, 2028. Turkey blamed the Syrian authorities for the March 17 suicide bombing in Istanbul, and they responded by sending troops around Afrin and making direct attacks on Kurdish and government-held areas. Within three days, they had taken Aleppo and Northern Idlib. The Syrian Transitional Government condemned Turkey's action as a violation of their sovereignty on April 6, 2028, and made it clear they wanted Turkey to leave immediately, threatening they'd react both militarily and diplomatically if necessary.

Presence in Syria - The Syrian Government currently controls most parts of Syria which includes strategic strongholds like Damascus, Homs and Hama. Their control extends from Raqqa in the East to Tartus in the West, Idlib in the North to Al-Suwayda in the South.



The United States of America

The United States initially entered the Syrian conflict with the primary objective of dismantling the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War had left a significant



power vacuum in Northern Syria, which ISIS swiftly exploited to establish its influence. Capitalizing on regional instability, the group recruited thousands of rebel fighters from across the Middle East. After splitting from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS moved into Syria in 2014 and seized control of key areas including Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. ISIS quickly gained notoriety for its brutal tactics — public executions, enslavement of minorities, and widespread inhumane violence — all designed to instill fear and assert dominance. By promoting a radical jihadist ideology and encouraging terrorism across the region, ISIS became a pressing threat that forced the United States and its Western allies to take action. In response, coalition forces began launching targeted airstrikes and coordinated ground operations against ISIS, often utilizing Turkish military bases as operational hubs. During this period, the U.S. government, through the CIA, launched **Operation Timber Sycamore** a covert initiative aimed at supporting anti-ISIS efforts. As part of this mission, the United States formed the **Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)** to lead formal operations against the terror group. In 2015, the U.S. also played a central role in establishing the **Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)**, a coalition primarily composed of Kurdish fighters from the northeast formerly known as the **People's Protection Units (YPG)** alongside some factions of the Free Syrian Army. This marked the beginning of the enduring partnership between the United States and the Kurdish forces in Syria. Despite Turkey's longstanding objections to the U.S. alliance with Syrian Kurds, Washington valued the SDF's effectiveness in combating ISIS and continued its cooperation effectively sidelining Ankara's concerns in favor of strategic military advantage. After ISIS threat was majorly exterminated from the Syrian and Iraqi region after years of joint operations by different countries, Donald Trump, President of the



USA, declared on 19th December, 2018 that their purpose in Syria was over and ISIS had been defeated. Following this declaration, the USA pulled out over 2000 of its soldiers from Syria and the funding for the SDF was reduced considerably.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the United States adopted a cautious yet increasingly assertive policy toward Syria. Initially hesitant to fully engage with the new Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led transitional government due to its extremist origins, Washington maintained indirect diplomatic contact while closely monitoring developments trying to promote peace in the Syrian region. The political landscape shifted dramatically in January 2025, when the transitional government of Syria agreed to incorporate different factions of Syria under a single banner to unite the entire of Syria. The United States of America became one of the first Western countries to remove trade barriers on Syria and pushed their old allies, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to enter into a power-sharing coalition with HTS, becoming the Transitional Government of Syria (TGS). This move, which elevated SDF commander Farhad Abdi Shaheen to the Vice President of Syrian Arab Republic, offered the U.S. a strategic opportunity to counterbalance extremist influence while also promoting lasting peace and stability in this highly volatile region, preserving its long-standing partnership with the Kurdish forces. Although wary of HTS, the U.S. interpreted the unification as a pathway toward stability, supporting the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Armed Forces and cautiously engaging with the new governing authority.

However, USA's plans did not work out as history seemed to repeat itself. The extremist factions of the HTS and other groups unhappy with the policies of the government joined forces with the Hurras



al-Din with a common objective, to take down the Transitional Government and establish an Islamic global state governed by Sharia Law. There was a resurgence of extremism in North-eastern Syria with the Hurras al-Din capturing the city of Deir-ez-Zor on 20th July along with the assassination of the Syrian President by the latter on 22nd July. The Syrian Armed Forces, stretched too thin due to innumerable conflicts and lack of resources were in no state to counter these threats. Moreover, tensions escalated in December 2025 after a terror attack in Raqqa killed six U.S diplomats embedded with the SDF including Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Syrian Arab Republic, prompting a decisive shift in U.S. policy. In January 2026, the Trump administration formally announced a new strategy that prioritized direct military and financial support to the SDF and the Transitional Government of Syria. This included arms shipments, funding, and training operations framed under counterterrorism efforts. The USA had now officially re-entered Syria, stationing 1500 troops. To enable this reallocation of resources, the U.S. reduced its financial commitments to NATO, a controversial move that fractured alliance cohesion and severely strained relations with Turkey. Ankara condemned American support for the Kurdish-led forces, accusing the U.S. of enabling separatist terrorism, and diplomatic relations between the two NATO allies plunged to historic lows. As Kurdish influence grew and Turkish hostility intensified—particularly after the assassination of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 2027 and Turkey's subsequent military operations in northern Syria—the U.S. found itself entangled in a widening regional crisis. Washington strongly condemned Turkish incursions, warning of the destabilizing impact on anti-terror efforts and Syrian sovereignty. In 2028, the United States pursued a policy of militarily directly supporting Kurdish-aligned forces. Nevertheless, by now, America had established itself as a



central actor in Syria's post-Assad future—militarily entrenched, diplomatically committed, and increasingly at odds with traditional allies over the path to regional stability. USA's intervention which began to counter extremist threat in the region and to stabilize Syria has now expanded to countering Russian and Chinese influence while navigating through the drift with their former allies, Turkey.

Presence in Syria - The US Army troops are mainly stationed in heavily defended Syrian Armed Forces military and air bases in the Raqqa region. US troops are also present in US military bases in Iraq just across the Eastern Syrian border.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

Historically Iran had aligned with the Assad Regime in the Syrian Civil War, viewing it as a strategic ally in the “Axis of Resistance”



against Israel and Western influence. Tehran feared that losing Assad would result in a pro-Western or Sunni-aligned government, weakening Iran's influence in the Levant and threatening its vital supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran provided Assad with financial aid, military advisors from the IRGC, and mobilized proxy forces including Hezbollah fighters and Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Its intervention was both ideological and geopolitical—preserving a Shi'a-aligned ally and protecting Iran's regional deterrence structure. However in 2024, Tehran which had been supporting the Assad Regime for years now was forced to shift its focus. Israel's attack on the Gaza Strip against Hamas and the invasion of Lebanon in October 2024 to take down Hezbollah along with the collective strikes of USA and its allies against the Houthis in Yemen forced Iran to stop its funding for Syria and instead focus on supporting its Shia militias. This crumbling support from Iran deeply weakened the already fragile Assad Regime and before Iran could realise their mistake, Damascus fell and Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow.

With the fall of the Assad Regime, Iran had not only lost one of its key Shia allies but had also lost its influence in Syria and its Sunni competitor, Saudi Arabia. Tehran viewed the rise of a Kurdish-HTS led coalition controlling large swaths of Syria as a direct threat to its regional agenda. Iran also became deeply concerned by the growing Saudi Arabia influence in Syria through its support for the Syrian Armed Forces, as well as by the potential establishment of an autonomous Kurdish corridor linking northeastern Syria with Iraqi Kurdistan—undermining Iranian territorial cohesion and empowering Kurdish separatists within its own borders. However, funding for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis had left Iran in a position where it



could no longer afford to venture into Syria. By 2025 Tehran recognized that the HTS-Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria coalition posed a major threat to regional balance. The unification of former jihadist factions with Kurdish militias, and their subsequent recognition by segments of the international community including the USA, represented a major warning sign for Iran. The new Syrian regime not only backed counter-terrorism efforts against Iran-backed militias but actively sought to dismantle Hezbollah's logistical networks in Syria. The Transitional Government of Syria's decision to sign a non-aggression treaty — *As-Salam fir Suriya* — with Israel delivered another strategic setback to Iran. At the time, Tehran was heavily focused on backing Hezbollah's military entrenchment against Israel and had little bandwidth to respond directly to the growing influence of Saudi-backed forces in Syria. But far worse was on the horizon. The situation escalated dramatically when Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon — launched in the aftermath of the 2026 Lebanese parliamentary elections — resulted in the deaths of several high-ranking figures from both Iran and Hezbollah. Tensions between Iran and Israel remained high well into 2027, marked by intermittent Iranian air assaults on Israeli-held areas. However, as Israel and Lebanon began de-escalating in early 2027, and with Jordan and Iraq entering oil agreements with Saudi Arabia, Iran's strategic attention once again shifted toward Syria. Recognizing a power vacuum and sensing opportunity, Iranian leadership prepared to reassert its presence. At that point, the Syrian Armed Forces were buckling under the pressure of fighting Hurras al-Din in the east and the Free Syrian Army in the north, both largely supported by Riyadh. Seizing the moment, Iran launched a coordinated offensive alongside Hezbollah, using long-range ballistic missiles to dismantle Syrian air defenses. These strikes paved the way for a ground advance:



Hezbollah forces crossed over from Lebanon and swiftly seized control of Tartus, before beginning their push toward Homs. Now in 2028, Iran treads on very thin ice as it formulates and plans its future actions. Iran's strategic moves in the region are becoming more difficult with each passing day. This difficulty began after the Hezbollah-led incursion in the year 2027, which completely failed, and Saudi Arabian dominance in the Middle East expanded without any visible limits. Over the past four years, Southern Lebanon's Hezbollah has faced massive losses, while Hamas has been severely overrun by Israeli forces. Simultaneously, the Syrian government, though considerably weakened, continues to exist with the support of the US and Saudi Arabia, continues to control Iran's access to the region and is slowly squeezing them out. Without decisive steps taken in the immediate future, losing Syria could result in a much steeper decline in Iran's standing in the Middle East."

Russian Federation

Following the initial invasion, the Ukraine counterattack had finished by that point. The war remained in a de facto stalemate, with Russia maintaining its occupation of several parts of Ukraine including Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya and Kyiv remained



controlled by Ukrainian forces. A formal ceasefire was never signed, but the fighting stopped. The cause of the stalemate in Ukraine was linked to the U.S. decision to focus more of its military and financial efforts on the Middle East. As part of its new strategy, first announced on 12 January 2026, the Trump administration started actively helping the Syrian Transitional Government and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. At the same time, defense money was moved elsewhere, meaning NATO and the Ukrainian effort each experienced big cuts in funding. Ukraine was unable to keep pushing forward because the U.S.'s policy in Europe made the country refocus on the Middle East which resulted in Kyiv reverting to defending itself and stopping its offensive, causing a freeze in fighting. Russia's **post-Ukraine recalibration**, following the **end of major hostilities with Ukraine in February 2026**, allowed it to reallocate military and strategic attention to Syria. With less strain on its resources, Russia became more assertive. This shift is evident in its support for **Turkey's covert military buildup in Afrin by March 18, 2028**, which included the **deployment of Russian-supplied heavy weaponry and the sale of 12 Su-57 fighter jets to Turkey**. On that day, Russia declared a defense partnership with Turkey and China, making it clear it is committed to building ties with many nations. As a consequence, Moscow now manages a vital port close to the Syrian city of Latakia, helping to enhance its navy's and logistics' activities in the region. At the port, military intelligence, logistics and support work were centralized, mainly due to growing stress in northern Syria.

Significantly, Russia brought Wagner Group forces into the war, as this organization complies with Russia's policies overseas. From March 18, 2028, Wagner operatives were present in the Latakia port



to guide, help with logistics and offer advice to both the Turkish Armed Forces and Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups.

Turkey began its deployment at the same time that it was organizing Operation Socrates, set to start on 29th March 2028 against Kurdish SDF and Syrian Government targets in the northeast. Even though Russia did not join the fighting, its impact was necessary for the Allied cause. Wagner members taught the Turkish army and FSA, provided intelligence support and aided in getting resources and weapons sent smoothly, helping achieve all military objectives. By enabling the Turkish-led offensive against U.S.-backed Kurdish forces, Russia created a counterweight to American strategic gains in Syria while avoiding direct confrontation. Control of the Latakia port and presence of Wagner operatives allowed Moscow to retain physical and geopolitical access to the Mediterranean and project stability in the region.

Presence in Syria - As of 2028, Russia's presence in Syria is very limited with the Port of Latakia under its control with few Wagner Group operatives stationed in the Latakia region surrounding the Port.

People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China, has adopted a broad strategy to develop ties with Middle Eastern nations, mainly focusing on economic growth, building power and stabilizing the region. China became a full participant in Islamic diplomacy when it was given



observer status at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2025 by the Council of Foreign Ministers, led by the Turkish Foreign Minister and Turkey's proposal was supported by Pakistan, Iran and Qatar.

China's role in Syria became much more significant as it restarted development in the region by investing in infrastructure under the BRI. Most of China's development operations occurred in Aleppo, Raqqa and Idlib and a Chinese field operations center was built there, with the help of modern tools and advanced software to secure infrastructure. The goal of these investments was to keep trade safe, help rebuild the region and maintain stability in northeast Syria with new technology and logistics.

At the beginning of 2027, a key part of China's regional strategy failed. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) executed a harmful cyber assault, generated false accusations and made them seem like Kurdish officials had given sensitive information to China. TIP said it was a Kurdish group exposing corruption, then distributed the fake emails to the media which resulted in a diplomatic incident. Despite the Kurdish government calling it a set-up, China paused BRI projects in Syria and arranged for investigators to look into what had happened. Thinking the leaks were organized, China joined forces with Turkey, arguing that Kurdish groups were helping TIP and destabilizing the region. As a result, China switched its attention from growth to safety and formed a mutual security deal with Turkey to prevent extremist threats and secure the BRI projects in the region. Beijing showed it would use both military and diplomatic actions to protect its foreign interests when its overseas endeavors seem to be at risk (May 2027).



The three-nation Russia-Turkey-China strategic alliance was completed on May 15, 2027, when Turkey and the other two countries signed a major defense agreement. According to the pact, China started supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) alongside Turkey and Qatar, supplying it with weapons and money to revive it after Aleppo. Funds were moved into strategic TIP efforts in order to make China's help more effective for its security needs. They started to openly support the FSA so that it could battle against extremists and also fight the weakened and risky Transitional Government, because it was led by Kurds. Military operations in the strategic triangle had become fully coordinated by 18 March 2028. Since Turkey had made defense agreements with China and Russia, it began quietly gathering military resources in Afrin. With the help of Syria, China supplied modern arms and almost doubled FSA funding to help Turkey release a huge military force to Syria. For the first time in China's regional policy, rearming the FSA through the input of China and Russia showed that economic interests could not be separated from its military pursuits.

State of Qatar

By 2028, Qatar's foreign policy stands as a reflection of careful calibration, rooted in strategic flexibility, economic foresight, and



diversified global partnerships. At the heart of its diplomatic doctrine lies a consistent effort to maintain balanced relations with competing global powers. Doha has long prioritized strong ties with both the United States and China, navigating a delicate balance across defense, energy, trade, and infrastructure development. This pragmatic neutrality enables Qatar to act independently on the world stage, maneuvering between allies without being tethered to a single bloc.

Qatar's involvement in Syria dates back to the early years of the civil war, during which it provided financial, political, and media backing to various opposition groups, including Turkey-aligned militias and factions of the Syrian National Army. Unlike many regional and Western actors who distanced themselves from the Syrian opposition during periods of stagnation, Qatar remained actively engaged throughout. By late 2024, as the Assad regime began to collapse, particularly after Russia and Iran reduced their direct support, Qatar saw a strategic opening and moved to reassert its influence in the region.

Capitalizing on its position as the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), Qatar leveraged its energy diplomacy to gain global relevance. In October 2024, disruptions in Red Sea and Mediterranean shipping lanes caused a spike in global LNG prices. Doha seized this moment, boosting exports and gaining critical diplomatic leverage across Europe and Asia, which would later serve it well in post-Assad Syria's reconstruction talks.

Following Assad's fall, Qatar accelerated efforts to align with China and Russia as part of its broader economic modernization under Qatar National Vision 2030. Infrastructure, energy, and technological investments from Beijing surged, with Qatar-China relations reaching



historic highs between 2024 and 2028. Qatar's embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further reinforced its ambition to become a regional trade and logistics hub, enhancing its connectivity across Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

This increasing tilt toward China, however, created distance between Qatar and the United States. Although Qatar refrained from publicly criticizing Washington, its growing alignment with Beijing and Ankara strained U.S.-Qatar relations. Qatar's long-standing alliance with Turkey remained unwavering; it provided weapons, financial aid, and diplomatic cover for Turkish-backed forces in Syria, and voiced consistent opposition to the Syrian regime.

The newly established Syrian government has accused Qatar of fueling insurgency, claiming it funneled arms to extremist groups like Hurras al-Din to destabilize the fragile post-war order. While Qatar denies such claims, its role in shaping the Syrian battlefield—both directly and through proxies—has added layers of complexity to its international posture. Doha continues to walk a diplomatic tightrope, publicly neutral toward the U.S., while its strategic loyalties increasingly lie elsewhere.

Republic of Iraq



Iraq is a country which plays a very important role in the Syrian region, especially in relation to the resurgence of extremist organisations in Syria. Iraq adopted a policy of **measured containment and strategic neutrality** in response to the growing instability along its western frontier, particularly the resurgence of the extremist group **Hurras al-Din** in eastern Syria. Iraq realized the serious risk to its security but preferred to focus on its people, independence and keeping alliances with nearby countries in balance instead of being involved in Syria's war. Iraqi counterterrorism functions are principally executed by the Counterterrorism Service (CTS), a Cabinet-level entity reporting directly to the prime minister, as well as by various security forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Kurdish Peshmerga.

On 22nd May 2027, Hurras al-Din took charge of strategic areas on the Syrian-Iraqi border, including Al-Bukamal, Ash-Shaddadi and Al-Suwar, alarming security officials. Regardless of these actions, Iraq did not raise plans of major military operations. Since the 2020s, Iraq had cultivated highly friendly relations with the USA, conducting joint operations to take down remaining ISIS and Al-Qaeda connected militias along with intelligence sharing programmes. The Syrian Government's fight against the Hurras al-Din and other extremist organisations also encouraged Iraqi-Syrian collaboration against extremist groups. However, Iraq's plan in relation to Syria, at least before 2028 was clear - aim at containing growing extremist threats within Syria and preventing their flow into Iraq. Iraq had been assisting US and Syrian forces in conducting strikes against the extremist threats in the region while making sure that the threats are contained outside their borders.



However, this Turkish invasion of Syria forces Iraq to reconsider its neutral policy as a direct conflict between Turkey and Syria involving the United States of America, would provide extremist groups like the Hurras al-Din the perfect chance not just to capture territory in Syria, but also enter Iraq to complete their objective of a global caliphate. Iraqi borders till now had been protected by the Syrian Armed Forces fighting with these insurgents but this will continue no more. Iraq needs to make decisions, be it taking a side in the war or deploying its own troops to counter the extremist threats - a decision which will determine its future.

Saudi Arabia and UAE



On their part, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while they have been opposed to popular revolutions and regime shifts, are making a tactical shift in Syria and supporting the new government and power dynamics in Syria.

Why are the Saudi and Emirates moving towards the HTS government in Syria?

Both nations view the Syrian change as a powerful chance to dislodge **Iranian influence in the Levant**. Even though Riyadh resumed diplomatic relations with Tehran after a successful Chinese intervention, and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi joined hands with the Iranian regime to reduce tensions in Yemen and terminate hostilities there, Saudi and UAE foreign policies remained circumspect about the ruinous role of Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The reality that Israeli military action has weakened Hamas and Hezbollah, and hence Iran, as well as the defeat of Iran's ally Assad, has given hope to the Gulf powers that they can assist in driving Iran out of Syria and sever its routes between Iraq and Lebanon. By embracing the HTS-led government, the Saudis and the Emiratis are expecting that Iran will no longer ever reclaim its grip on Syria. The Saudi and Emirati hopes have been confirmed by the HTS government issuing the above-mentioned decree prohibiting Iranians from visiting Syria and adopting good relations with Türkiye and the Gulf states as its strategic option.

Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have relearned some useful lessons from their own past errors in times of turbulence in Iraq and Yemen that are informing their engagement in post-Assad Syria. In Iraq, the Saudis



and UAE chose not to play in the power game after Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003, and the Americans and Iranians alone took control of Iraqi politics. In Yemen, the Saudis and Emiratis adopted a strategy of turning a blind eye to war between 2012 and 2015 until the Houthi movement, funded and armed by Iran, seized control of northern Yemen and began war with other factions. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi rushed to spearhead an Arab coalition to drive out the Houthis. The two nations became entangled in what became a vicious war that spilled outside Yemen's territory. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had to bear a tremendous political and security cost due to their initial reluctance to get involved in Yemen. In Syria, the Gulf leaders are calling for a more engaging role at an early stage than they did in previous regional wars.

Syria is at the heart of the post-Gaza war geostrategic changes in the Middle East. Israel's reach outside its homeland and the Palestinian territories has grown while Iran's has declined, unleashing a Pandora's box of contentious politics and sovereignty issues in the Levant states, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The geographical proximity of the Levant to the Gulf requires proactive Saudi and UAE diplomacy and interaction with the new power and influence architecture in the Levant, in a bid to forestall Israel's expansionist policies and Türkiye's neo-Ottoman aspirations of a hegemonic role in the Middle East. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also want to preclude the potential for Iran and its affiliates to regroup and come back as a patron of Syria.

Saudi and UAE rapprochement with Syria has occurred simultaneously with the two states seeking to be more assertive in the Middle East. Both nations have come to value involvement in all regional theaters without hesitation and to protect their interests in a



Middle East riddled with conflict and instability. This forceful foreign policy, as visible in Gaza and Lebanon and in Syria, can similarly position both Saudi Arabia and the UAE more central to regional security issues and more relevant to the great powers interested in Middle Eastern stabilization efforts alongside regional players.

In 2025, Saudi Arabia supported Syria's change of governments through a strong, multi-layered policy and became a major influence on the country's political and security situation. The kingdom tried to support Syria's stability, lead in diplomatic efforts and forge regional alliances to safeguard its own interests, as Iran and extremist movements became stronger.

Saudi Arabia's support for the Transitional Government of Syria became publicly evident on 2nd April 2025, when Riyadh, joined by the UAE and other Gulf states, condemned Israel's takeover of UN buffer zones near the Syrian-Israeli border, labeling it an "Israeli invasion." In a show of solidarity with Syria's new authorities, Saudi Arabia signed arms trade agreements with the Transitional Government, enabling the rapid formation and arming of the Syrian Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, the support from the material and political side ran into resistance when battles began. Saudi-backed Syrian troops started an offensive against Deir-ez-Zor to take it back from the extremist group Hurras al-Din on 22nd July 2025. Even working with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the mission did not work, demonstrating that Syria's security is still fragile. As a result of this time, extremist groups with stockpiles and remaining weapons infrastructure expanded across eastern Syria, but Saudi Arabia confirmed its role in



Syria's political transition. After the President's assassination, Riyadh sent condolences and, on 29th November, made it official that Farhad Abdi Shaheen was now the Transitional Government President, promising to continue supporting him.

Between July and December 2025, as Syria's military was stretched on several battlefields against Hurras al-Din, Turkish-support groups and heightened tension with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. provided more support behind the scenes and on paper without getting directly involved in fighting.

When the region's political boundaries became more pronounced, Saudi Arabia strongly joined the U.S., among others, supporting the Transitional Government. On 30th January, Saudi Arabia co-participated in military movements and gave important aid to Syrian government troops to prevent further Turkish activities in the region and the ongoing polarization over Syria's legitimacy. Officials from Saudi Arabia also agreed with President Shaheen that the Turkish-backed Interim Government endangers stability in the region.

At the same time, Riyadh used politics and energy to establish stronger links with Jordan and Iraq by making oil-related agreements. By February 2027, Saudi moves made the kingdom more powerful in the region and led Iran to consider Saudi Arabia's developing influence as threatening its corridor from Iran to the Levant.

Saudi backing was clear in July 2027, as Hezbollah fighters in western Syria were faced with a major offensive by the Syrian Armed Forces supported by Saudi equipment and backed by Israeli airplanes. When Hezbollah was pushed back to the border of Lebanon by this



offensive, it became evident that working together with the Gulf, Israel and Syria was effective in countering Iranian allies.

Understanding that increased regional tension, Saudi Arabia summoned the Tenth Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference of the OIC on 14th April 2028.



Republic of Lebanon

The Republic of Lebanon had historically maintained an ambiguous and often constrained position in relation to the Syrian Civil War. It had tried to disassociate itself from the Civil War, completely trying to keep itself out from entangling into regional tensions. However this policy of the Lebanese government was highly ironic as despite their non-involvement in the War in the past, Hezbollah - a major political and military force in Lebanon, although acting independently had sent thousands of soldiers and rebels to fight in Syria for the Assad Regime. From 2012, Lebanon had also served as a key point for supplies reaching the Assad Regime with thousands of shipments of weapons and ammunition from Iran entering Syria through the Hezbollah of Lebanon. The Lebanese Government before 2026 had not supported these cross border operations of Hezbollah and had even criticized Hezbollah's actions. However, they lacked the power to impose any meaningful limits. As a result, Lebanon had effectively tolerated Hezbollah's involvement, viewing it as a reality of internal power dynamics.

There was a sharp change in the policies of the Lebanese government after the Lebanese Parliamentary Elections of 2026, which led to a new Prime Minister, Talal Hamieh along with more than 80 new Members of Parliament being elected. Many of these newly elected politicians were suspected to be closely affiliated to Hezbollah, even though not directly related such as Ex-Health Minister Mohammad Jawad Khalifeh who had regained a seat in the Parliament. Even the Prime Minister was accused of supporting Hezbollah. Israeli President, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that the Lebanese Government had been elected due to the financial and military support from Hezbollah and that now the Government was a puppet



of Hezbollah. The changes in the Lebanese Government's policies also indicated the same where a blind eye was turned to any actions taken by Hezbollah. Moreover, the Lebanese Government even deployed the Lebanese Military in some instances to help Hezbollah under the pretense of "protecting national security" as was seen on 7th July, 2026 against Israeli Forces and in 2027 against Syrian Forces. Lebanon's government has now adopted a much more aggressive stance with respect to the regional conflicts. Although Lebanon still avoids interfering in other conflicts, be it the Israel Palestine issue or the Syrian Turkey problem, yet the new Lebanese Government has at times threatened all out war at times when Hezbollah was threatened. Despite numerous claims, no proof exists of the government's collaboration with Hezbollah, so does the Lebanese Government deploy troops to protect itself or to protect its secret allies? These are just some of the questions which the Lebanese Government shall need to answer through its actions at this time of conflict.



Palestine

The Israeli invasion of Gaza strip which began on 7 October, 2023 after the Hamas group launched thousands of missiles targeting Israeli infrastructure had by December 2024 turned into a large-scale conflict with other countries getting involved. Hezbollah and Iranian missile strikes to take down Israeli Defense Forces forces had resulted in the Israeli attack on Hezbollah in October, 2024 which saw Israeli Defense Force troops entering into Lebanon and attacking strategic Hezbollah bases. Israel's invasion of Lebanon had deeply weakened Hezbollah and exhausted the capability of Iran to fund its militias. Iran had to fund Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis simultaneously, each of which were facing heavy losses due to direct enemy confrontations. By around May 2025, Israel's invasion of Hezbollah had reached a stalemate where Israel had destroyed several key Hezbollah targets, yet continuous Iranian supplies kept Hezbollah in the fight while Israel also had to face a military standoff along the Syrian-Israeli border. Hence, Israel retreated its land troops from Lebanon, although occasional drone strikes against Hezbollah targets continued.

In July 2026, following Israeli deathly missile strike on Hezbollah targets which led to the death of Iranian Minister of Defense, a new resurgence was seen in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas in the Gaza strip and armed rebels in the West Bank launch coordinated



strikes on the Israeli government. By early 2027, Israel managed to completely crush this resurgence, taking over major parts of the Gaza Strip once again while also establishing their control over the West Bank. This resurgence movement in the Palestinian West Bank had given Israel the reason it needed to take over administrative control of the entire West Bank. Israeli troops were sent into the West Bank while even stricter surveillance was imposed on the Palestinians in the West Bank - their rights now completely ignored. The Palestinian Government, the PLO although still controlled and administered the West Bank on paper, Israel had taken over all administrative control in reality. The PLO continued criticising the actions of Israel with the help of Arab nations, but to no use.

In 2028, the Palestinian Government holds a very neutral policy in a conflict like the Turkish invasion of Syria. The PLO sides with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and accepts the HTS-SDF coalition as the proper leaders of Syria yet due to Israeli friendship with the new Syrian Government, refrains from establishing friendly relations.



Arab Republic of Egypt

The main goal in Egypt's Syria policy is to guarantee Arab national security and reflect Syria's traditional role in their own national stability. Syria's security is important for Egypt's stability, so Cairo has demanded a thorough and inclusive political settlement following United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. The framework, according to senior officials including El-Gebaly, supports a political process run by the Syrian people and rejects division based on sects, in order to protect the country's national institutions.

Egypt has opened its doors to over 1.5 million Syrian people, guaranteeing them safety, letting them access services and helping them join the community.

Egypt has openly opposed acts by outside countries against Syria and has specifically denounced Israel's recent activities in the Golan Heights. Egypt's Foreign Ministry said Israel's actions in occupying Syrian territories and not respecting the agreement of 1974 are illegal. With the help of other members, Egypt is playing a key role in uniting Arabs against Israel's ongoing occupation and continuing to back Syria's unity.

At a time of regional confusion, Egypt has taken on a role to stabilize the region, help protect Syria's sovereignty and work for diplomatic outcomes and the security of the entire Arab community.



GUIDE TO PAPERWORK

The United Nations Historic General Assembly will have the following forms of paperwork:

- 1) Position Papers
- 2) Communiques (Private and Public communiques)
- 3) Presidential Statements
- 4) Draft Resolutions
- 5) Directives

(Note: All the formats for the specific types of paperworks are given in the conference handbook with the necessary deadlines. This is just a committee specific paperwork guide)

The deadline to submit the position papers is **9th June, 2025**.

Communiques: Communiques are messages from usually an allotment to another country, an organization, person or even the executive board. They are meant to facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis so that delegates can take action to resolve the various crises presented to them in the committee. The executive board will appreciate communiques which are long and detailed and which backs the policy of the allotment.



Delegates can send out a series of communiques if they want to accomplish a specific committee goal, or they can use them to reply to committee updates. All communications, nevertheless, must be ratified by the Executive Board. Once the session begins, the delegates will be informed of the communication limit for the day or session as well as the state of the lines of communication.

The committee will accept two pre-committee paperwork (this includes communiques, presidential statements, MOU's, treaties, etc.), and **the communication lines for the same will close on 10th June at 11:59 p.m.**



CITATIONS

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5. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC.en.mfa?utm_source=chatgpt.com
6. <https://www.hstoday.us/featured/the-evolving-dynamics-of-the-syrian-civil-war-syrias-rebels-and-uncertain-future/>
7. <https://shelterbox.org/where-we-work/syria/conflict/>
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10. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/8/what-happened-in-syria-has-al-assad-really-fallen>